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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the passage of the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958, the SBIC program has ooen the subject o:f numerous studies, most 
of which have dealt with the intention of the program, its need m-
how ~11 SBICs were fulfilling the role for which they were envi-
sioned by Congress. Few, however, have covered the investment 
characteristics of SBIC common stocks in an effort to appraise 
their potential as investment vehicles. After a period of enthusi-
astic investor response followd irmnadiately by a prolonged period 
of investor disfavor, a study of this nature now aprears to be in 
order. 
This paper logically divides into three sections. First, 
a study o:f the empirical data covering the background of the ori-
ginating legislation, the Act itself, its Amendments and the develop-
ment o:f the program is necessary. Secondly, an analysis, basicall,y 
objective, of the investment philosophies and operating policies o:f 
SBICs must be made. Finally, an analysis of the market price per-
formance o:f SBIC CODmlon stocks to date and the experience o! other 
similar venture capital organizations, to gain historical perspec-
tive, is drawn upon in order to arrive at satisfactory conclusions 
as to the :f'uture value of SBIC common stocks as an investment vehicle. 
Because of the fact that SBIC stocks are a relatively new 
investment medium, and the very nature of the study, the writer has 
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necessarily drawn heavily upon personal contacts and personal ex-
perience as an investment analyst, in the absence of established 
reference data, for a major portion of the information pertaining 
to the subject. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE 91ALL BUSINESS 
INVESIMENT COMPANY ACJr OF 1958 
The basis purpose of the Snall Business !nves'bnent Act 
of 19581 is clearly stipulated in the act itself as follows: 
"It is declared to be the policy of the 
Congress and the purpose of this Act to improve !: ·~~:; 
and stimulate the national economy in general 
and the small-business segment thereof in par-
ticular by establishing a program to stimulate 
and supplement the flow of private equity capi-
tal and long-term loan funds which small-business 
concerns need for the sotm.d financing of their 
business operations and for their growth, expan-
sion, and modernization, and which are not avail-
able in adequate supply: Provided, however, That 
this policy shall be carried out in such manner 
as to insure the maximum participation of private 
financing sources." 
This declarative judgment that an adequate supply of equity 
capital and long-term loans was not available to small busine sa was 
based upon impressive empirical data. These data were deemed import-
ant enough to be included in the report of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Canmittee2 on the bill mich authorized the establishment of 
the small business investment company prograni. It is covered here as 
valuable ba.ckgrotm.d information concerning the legislation. 
1958 
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As early as 19.34 the U. s. Department or CCilliiJ3 rce con-
ducted a nationwide survey.3 concerning the financing problems or 
snall business. This study, covering 6,000 manufacturing firms em-
ploying between 21 and 250 persons, indicated that long-term fUnds 
could not be obtained fran any source by nearly one-half of firms 
indicating a need for them. In 19.38, a Committee of the Business 
Advisory Council for the Department of Canmerce made a similar study4 
with identical results. It is significant to note that the Camnerce 
Department estimated that over two-thirds of the firmS studied in 
both reports were acceptable credit risks to the usual financing 
channels on the basis of their reported financial condition. While 
it is true that the business conditions of the 1930s wre not lena-
ficial to attempts to obtain long-term financing for firms or any 
size, these two reports indicate that the problem of obtaining long-
term financing for snall business has been in existence for as long 
as thirty years. 
In 1943, Mr. Roy Foulke of Dun & Bradstreet conducted a 
lengthy study of the capital and credit position of small business 
firms. He informed the Senate Sna11 Business Camni ttee5 in that year 
3Bureau of the Census, "Survey of Reports of Credit and 
Capital Difficulties by Sna1l Manufacturers," 19.35 (As cited in 
SnAlJ BusineSS Amen4ments Of' 1959, P• 569.) 
4 Bureau of the Census, "Survey of Reports of Credit and 
Capital Difficulties of Snall Manufacturers," 19.38 (As cited in 
Briefing RP The Inve stmept Act., Canmi ttee on Banking and Currency, 
1958, p. 12.) 
5 
"Snall Business Access to Capital", Sen. Spec. Com. on 
Snall Business, Sen. Co. Print No. 14, 78th Cong., 1st Sass., (194.3) 
(As cited in Snall Business Amendments of 1959, p. 569. 
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that the results of his study sho\o.ed that there was no organized 
source or sources to provide long-term :f'unds to small or intermediate-
sized concerns under the existing economic structure in this country. 
The investment banking :fraternity w.s also concerned 'With 
the problem. In 1944, a special committee was established by the 
Investment Bankers Association of America6 to study and report on 
the problem of how it might assist in providing adequate capital to 
small business in the United States. It concluded that the invest-
ment banking mechanism was not equipped to take care of the capital 
needs of small business and therefore could not be expected to do so. 
Furthermore, it reported that :from its findings the sources which 
had previously supplied the largest portion of snall business capital, 
both internal and external, had dried up due to the effect of Federal 
taxation and the influence of social change. 
In the period following World War II, Congress also began 
to show an increasing allareness of the problems of adequate business 
financing. Ib 1949, Congress authorized the Joint Eoonomic Camni ttee 7 
to study and report on private investment and the role of the Govern-
ment in promoting investment capital. Extensive hearings ~re held on 
the subject and the Caumittee concluded that small business could not 
obtain adequate financing. The Camnittee recommended that Congress 
~vestment Bankers Association of America~ "Adequacy of 
Capital For Snall Business," 1945 (As ei ted in Briefing on ;,e In-
ves"bnent Act, Canmittee on Banking and Currency, 1958, p. 12. 
7Joint Committee on Econanic Report, "Volume and 
of Private Investment"~- s. Doc . 149, Slat Cong., 2d Seas. 
in Snall Business An1endn!ents of 1959, p. 569.) 
stability 
(as cited 
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take sane action. In 1950, the "Snall Business Act of 1959"8 was 
introduced in the Senate. The bill provided for the establishment 
of privata national investment companies, with capital supplied by 
the Federal Reserve Banks, to provide long-term debt and equity capital 
to snall business. It was not passed by Congress as attention was di-
verted by the outbreak of the Korean War. 
In 1957, hearings were held by the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Camnittee on the credit needs of small business. The major 
portion of the testimony heard over nine days of bearings from finan-
cial experts from a wide range of organizations, as w:~ll as State 
and Federal Governments, stressed the lack of long-term capital f~an-
cing. &lpport was expressed for the establishment of ~me type of 
snall business investment program. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
System agreed to undertake a thorough study of snail busine as finan-
cing. 
In April, 1958, parts one and two of the three part Federal 
Reserve study9 were issued, and the bearings of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Canmi ttee wre resumed. This extensive study further confirmed 
the findings of the earlier studies. The major finds of the study were 
summarized by the Chaim.an of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
8 s. 3625, Slst Cong., 2d Sass. (As cited in SnR11 Business 
Amendments of 1959, p. 569.) 
u. s. 
-7-
William McChesney Martin, as follows :10 
"These general findings from the study con-
firm the impression • • • that there is a gap in 
existing structure of financing institutions which 
lies in the longer term debt and equity capital 
areas ••• 
In specifying a gap in the financing facili-
ties available to snall business in these terms, it 
needs to be remembered that the bulk of the small-
business population is engaged in routine or repe-
titive activities that primarily provide a means of 
support to the owner and perhaps a few other indivi-
duals, and grow only slowly over the years. These 
small businesses frequently have enough permanent 
long-term inva stment and are not in the market for 
more, since the use of more long-term f'unds would 
only reduce the rate of return to present owners. 
There are rome small business enterprises, 
hoYBver, that offer a promising growth potential. 
They have indentifiable financing needs that are 
not being met. 
Although smne elements of the study remain to 
be canpleted, enough information has been amassed 
to suggest that there is room for a Government pro-
gram to foster the flow of private investment funds 
to small business." 
This testililony given by Mr. Martin to the Banking aDd Cur-
rency Committee on the findings of the Federal Reserve study not only 
materially added to the evidence of the existing financial gap in the 
available financing for snall business, but served as a prime force 
behind the passage of the Snall Business Investment Act of 1958~ 
The Conmittee Bill, ~ich resu1ted from the hearings, essen-
tially became the Snall Business Investment Act of 1958 with a few 
10 Financing Sna1.1 Busine ss1 He§rings Before a Subcgnm:i;t tee 
of the Committee on Banking and Currencr, u. s. Senate, 85th Cong., 2d 
Sass. on s. 2160, s. 2185, s. 3191, s. 3642, and s. 3651, (1958), u. s. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. c., 1958, pp. 49-78. 
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minor changes which originated from the debate in the Senate and 
in the House. In reporting the Bill out, the Committee underlined 
the purposes of the program as follows: 11 
(1) To supplement, rather than supplant, existing 
private facilities. 
(2) To operate under a simple and fiexible organi-
zational structure. 
(3) To operate and ba accounted for in complete sepa-
ration from other Federal small-business progrruns. 
(4) To utilize to the maximum possible extent the fa-
cilities of State and local development credit 
corporations, and 
(5) To concentrate upon meeting the equity and long-
term credit needs of small-business concerns. 
Before analyzing the provisions of the Act itself, a con-
sideration of other pertinent factors brought forth by the cited 
studies which led to its passage is in order. First, although many 
definitions exist of what constitutes a small busines~, the one used 
by the ,Snall Business Administration in its regular loan programl-2 ap-
pears now to be generally accepted. Under this definition to qualify 
as a snail business, a company must: 
(1) Be independently owned and operated. 
(2) Be non-dominant in its field. 
(3) If a manufacturing firm, haw average em-
ployment of less than 250 persons in the 
previous four quarters 
a. Employees on the above basis 
could be between 250 and 1,000 per-
sons depending upon its industry 
11Small Business Amendemnts of 1959, Hearings Before a Sub-
cqnmitt,ee of tbe a~·ttr,e on Birijdng and currency, u. s. Senate, S6th 
Cong., 1st Sass., lCJ59\ U. s. Govt. Printing Office, Wash., D.c. 1959, p. 5'71. 
12
-what It Is, What It Does, Snail Business Administration, U:~s. 
Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D. c., June, 1959. 
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(4) If a wholesale firm, its sales cannot ex-
ceed $5 million. 
(5) If a retail finn, its sales cannot exceed 
$1 million. 
It is necessary to point out that the Snal.l Business In-
vestment Act of 1958 was concermd with assisting snall businesses 
in meeting only their long-term credit and/or equity capital require-
mente. The law was not intended to furnish assistance in the areas 
of short-term and/or intermediate-term credit. 
The studies made ani testimony given in the hearings pre-
ceding the passage of the Act indicate that there is no serious lack 
or short-term credit, where the maturity or loans is less than one 
year, for small business. Funds appear to be available in adequate 
supply from a variety of sources on both a secured and unsecured basis. 
Trade sources, primarily manufacturers and wholesale suppliers, are 
believed to be the largest single source of short-term funds to snall 
business, while commercial banks are the largest of the institutional 
sources. Finance companies are also a growing and significant source 
of short-term funds. 
Intermediate-term credit is defined as loans with maturities 
of from one to . five years. There has been significant increase in 
the volume of such funds available to small business in recent year. 
Commercial. banks have been granting more term loans or from one to 
five years duration. Approximatel.r one-third of aJ.1 bank loans are 
now of this type. Finance canpanies are al.so an important source of 
intermediate-term funds. In addition, various business loan programs 
or the Federal Government have increased the source or funds available 
-10-
in this area. The present SBA loan program has provided over $1 
billion in loans since its formation in 1953 'With an average maturity 
of five years. While the amount of Government loan financing in it-
self has not been overly significant, it has teen a major factor in 
encouraging commercial be.nks to expand their term loan operations. 
A distinction between equity capital and long-term credit 
does not appear to l:e necessary. In both cases, experience indicates 
that there is a severe shortage ef available funds for the financing 
of small business. For practical purposes, the term "equity gap" which 
has been used to describe the lack of funds available for long-term 
financing, covers both long-term credit and equity capital. In the 
former area credit is usually limited to real estate mortgage financing 
from commercial be.nks and life insurance companies. tong-term bank 
loans to amall businesses are a relatively minor amount. The princi-
pal source of equity capital for small business is through direct 
negotiations either with individuals or organizations. Public offer-
ings are usually not practical for snall businesses due to the high 
costs involved in under~iting. 
CHAPTER ITI 
DESCRIPTION OF THE !MALL BUSINESS 
INVESTMENT ACT OF 1958 AND AMENDMENTS 
The 5nall Business Investment Act of 1958 established 
Small Business Investment Companies and authorized a new division 
of the Small Business Administration to license and supervise them. 
Since the legislation was experimental in nature, it is not sur-
prising that the initial legislation has been substantially altered 
by subsequent amending legislation and rules and regulations issued 
by the SBA. The purpooo of this chapter is to touch briefiy on the 
major provisions of the original legislation, primarily those still 
in effect. In addition, certain or the amendments to the original 
legislation will be discussed here as well as in subooquent chapters 
Where they have an important bearing upon the subject under discussion. 
The basis provisions or the original act provided for (1) the 
method of formation of SBICs, (2) the granting of their po~rs as 
licensees, (3) the authorization to barrow and invest funds, and (4) 
the SBA to prescribe regulations governing the operations or small 
business investment companies. The provisions dealing with the method 
or formation (the subnission of a proposal to the SBA in order to ob-
tain a license) and the general corporate pol'.~rs granted with the permit 
to commence operations have remained relatively unchanged to this data. 
However, there have been significant and numerous revisions concerning 
the right or SBICs to borrow and invest funds, .and a steady. stream. of 
regulations concerning operations which have resulted in constant re-
visions in the laws under which the program has progressed. 
-11-
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It was the intention of Congress to provide t1-JO major 
incentives to the formation of SBICs and t hereby attract funds to 
the program. The first was in the form of ample and inexpensive 
Federal funds, which was covered in the original act. The second 
concerned favorable tax treatment for SBICs \tbich was later enacted 
in the Technical Amendments Act of 1958.13 
The first of these incentives is covered under Section 
302. (a) and 303. (b) of the Act Which reads as follows: 
See. 302 (a) "Each C(l!lpany authorized to operate under 
this Act shall have a paid-in capital and sur-
plus equal to at least $300 1000. In order to 
facilitate the formation of small business in-
vestment companies, the Administration is hereby 
authorized, notwithstanding any other provisions 
of law, to purchase the debent1,1res of any such 
company in an amou,nt equal to not more than $150,000. 
Any debentures purchased by the Administration under 
this subsection shall be subordinate to any other 
debenture bonds, promissory nota s, or other obli-
gations which may be issued by such eompania s, and 
small be deemed a part of the capital and surplus 
of such companies for purposes of this section and 
sections 303 (b) and 306 of this Act." 
See. 303 (b) "To encourage the formation and growth of 
small business investment eompanie s, the Admini s-
trati on is authorized to land funds to such eom-
panie s through the purchase of their obligations 
which mall tear interest at such rate, and con-
tain such other terms, as the Administration may 
fix. The total amount of obligations purchased 
and outstanding at any one time by the Administra-
tion under this subsection in any one company shall 
not exceed 50 percent of the paid-in capital and 
surplus o~ such company." 
Thus the act provided that an SBIC could be formed with as 
little as $150,000 in private funds which could be raised to the $300,000 
minimum by the sale of $150,000 in debentures to the SBA which would be 
13Publie Law 85-866, 85th Congress, ~ptembe:t,· , 1958. 
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considered as part of the capital base upon 'Whieh the SBIC could 
borrovr an additional 50 percent of paid-in capital and surplus 
($150,000 for the minimum-sized SBIC). No limitation at the time 
was placed upon the dollar amount that could be borrowd under Sec-
tion 303 (b) except that the amount could not exceed 50 percent of 
paid-in capital and surplus. Regulations later determined that the 
interest rate on the SBA funds would be 5 percent and the maturity 
would be not over 20 years with amortization commencing during the 
final half of the term. 
These provisions remained in effect until the passage of 
the 1961 Amendments14 to the Snall Business Investment Act in October 
of that year. It is interesting to note that through September, 1961 
only $45 million of the $38; million in the program at that time was 
supplied by the Government, and a portion of this was in the form of 
contingent investments. The low ratio of Government funds to total 
capital was due primarily to the large amount of funds raised by public 
offerings of SBIC stock. 
The 1961 Amendments liberalized the law regarding the in-
flux of Government funds in order to facilitate the formation and 
growth of SBICs by raising the amount of Section 302 (a) debentures 
that the SBA may purchase to "an amount not to exceed the lesser of 
$400,000 or the amount of the paid-in capital and surplus of the com-
pany fran other sources." The amount of initial capital funds that 
could be obtained from the SBA was thus raised from $150,000 to 
$400,000. The minimum amount of paid-in capital and surplus remains 
at $300,000, including the $150,000 of the so-called "formation 
14 Public Law 86-502, 87th Congress, O,ctober 31, 1961. 
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sub-debs." The Amendments did, ho~ver, provide that the debentures 
could be purchased only to the extent that the necessary funds are 
not available to the canpany from private sources at reasonable terms. 
In addition, a new time limit was placed on such purchases. A new 
company must draw do'Wil tba funds within three years of their date of 
licensing and existing companies, all of which are eligible to apply 
for the increase in SBA funds, must apply prior to October 3, 1964. 
A provision of the new law also placed a new maximum of $4 million 
which may be loaned to any SBIC under the provisions of Section 303 
(b) of the original Act, in addition to 50 percent of paid-in capital 
and surplus limitations. 
The 1961 Amendments were expected to re.sul t in a sharp in-
crease in the demand for SBA funds in the SBIC program. In order to 
meet this anticipated demand, the SBA set aside $75 million in addi-
tional funds in its SBIC revolving fund. 
These provisions of the Amendments recognized the diffi-
culties that minimum-sized SBICs were encountering in operations. It 
was anticipated that the Amendments would encourage the formation of 
companies with assets in the $1 million area, rather than the pre-
ponderance of canpanies which were either the mininnml $3001 000 size 
or the extremely large ones which were financed through public under-
writings. To date, the liberalization has had little effect upon the 
size of the new SBICs. Over two-thirds continue to be of the $300,000 
minimum and the great majority of the remaining :1'unds have been raised 
through large public offerings. There are tw major reasons behind 
the failure or the 1961 Amendments to achieve the desired effects in 
- 15-
this area. First, the majority of companies fornBd since 1961 had 
their proposals before the SBA prior to the passage of the Amendments 
and were therefore based upon the then existing $150,000 maximum. 
Secondly, there has been a general slowdo~m in the formation of SBICs 
since the stock market collapse in May or 1962. Further liberaliza-
tion of the provisions regarding the availability of Government funds 
to SBICs is in prospect. Late in the 87th Congress, a bill was in-
· t~oduced in the Senate (S.3737) and ~ich has been carried over to the 
88th Congress w.t th an excellent chance or passage. The provisions of 
the Bill (H. R. 799, s. 298) include: 
(1) Raise from $400,000 to $1 million the 
amount or private capital ~ich SBA 
could match under Section 302 (a) • 
(2) Permit the SBA to guarantee loans to 
SBICs up to 100 percent or their paid-
in capital and surplus, or $8 million, 
whichever is the lessor, thereby liter-
ali zing Section 303 (b) • 
(3) Removes limitation of $500,000 on loan 
or investment by an SBIC in any one busi-
ness. 
The remaining provisions of the Small Business Investment 
Act of 1958 covered the types or securities of a small business con-
cern which an SBIC could purchase, aggregate lilnitations or invest-
mente, exemptions, and miscellaneous provisions. Section 304 provided 
that equity capital could be advanOE!d only in the form of convertible 
debentures. Congress did not anticipate that SBICs "WOuld be 'Willing 
to make investments in any other type of securities and therefore made 
no provision for other than convertible debentures. This restriction 
on the type of investment permitted was removed by the 1960 
-16-
Amendmentsl5 aid SBICs since that time have been able to invest in 
the common stock, preferred stock, and debentures with warrants as 
well as the convertible debentures of a small business concern. 
Section 305 of the original legislation authorized SBICs 
to make long-term loans with a maturity not in excess of twenty 
years to small business concerns. Subsequent regulations issued by 
the SBA have established a minimum maturity of five years 'With amorti-
zation not to exceed 20 percent per year during the first five years 
of the term. 
Section 306 reads as follows : 
11Wi thout · the approval of the Administra-
tion, the aggregate amount of obligations and 
securities acquired and far which commitments 
may be issued by any small business investment 
company under the provisions of this Act for 
any single enterprise shall not exceed 20 per-
cent of the combined capital and surplus of such 
small business investment company authorized by 
this Act." 
This section has remained unchanged to date. 
Section 307 provided amendments to the Securities Act of 
1933, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the Investment Act of 
1940. These amendments provided special treatment for SBICs and 
will be discussed in some detail in a later chapter. Section 308 
covered miscellaneous provisions of the law dealing with examina-
tiona, violations o£ the law, extension o£ an SBIC's corporate axis-
tence, cooperation with banks or other financial institutions and use 
of the services of the Federal Reserve System and the Department of 
Commerce. 
15 . . 
Pub11c Law 86-502, 87th Congress, October 31, 1961. 
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A n snall business concern" was defined under the Act as 
having the same meaning as in The Snail Business Act.l6 The :SBA 
then decided that the complex size standards which were utilized in 
its direct loan program had no relevance to the SBIC program and 
issued Regulation 103 Which applied exclusively to SBIC investments. 
It provided that a business was not a "snall business concern" if: 
(a) Its securities -were pl.iblicly traded. 
(b) It had raised mora than $300,000 on the 
public sale of its securities during the 
past three years. 
(c) It had aggregate assets of $5 million or 
more. 
(d) Its after-tax earnings had averaged $150,000 
or more over the past three years. 
While this regulation was in effect, the SBA reserved the right to 
pass on individual cases that did not meet the criteria. Unofficially, 
it often fell back upon the standards used in the direct loan program. 
Approximately 125 SBICs were licensed under this regulation. 
However, in October, 1960, the SBA revised the original standards of 
Regulation 103 and finally adopted the direct loan program standards 
as sn alternative measure. A third standard was added in April, 1961, 
providing more liberal size standards for a client located in an area 
of "substantial labor surplus." 
'Ihe simplest size standard to use in determining the eligi-
bility of businesses for SBIC financing is the general size standard, 
which is the revised version of the original definition contained in 
the 1958 Act. This specifies that a "small business" for the purposes 
16 Public Law 85-538, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958. 
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of the law may have maximum total assets of $5,000,000 , maximum net 
worth of $2,500,000, and maximum average net earnings over the two 
previous years of $250,000. These figures are liberalized to $6,250,000, 
$3,125,000, and $312,500, respectively in areas of substantial labor 
surplus. Each of the sa three measuring criteria must be satisfied under 
the law. If a prospective SBIC Client does not meat the general size 
standards, it still may qualify under the industry size criteria used 
by the SBA in determining eligibility for its direct loan program. 
The general size criteria, ho"Wever, is the one used in the vast ma.jor-
i ty of cases in determining whether a business is "small" or not. 
Regardless of which size standard is used, certain other 
requirements must be met. A small business concern for the purpose 
of receiving financial assistance from an SBIC must be with its affili-
ates independently o"nad and operated, not dominant in its field of 
operations and not engaged in a prohibited business. The question 
of independent owership requires that the firm together with its 
parent, subsidiaries and/or affiliates, meet the general size stan-
dards considered as a single unit. In detennining daninance, Fonn 480 
provide a the following information: 
"A concern is not dominant in its field of 
operations l-ben it does not exercise a controll-
ing or major influence in a kind of business ac-
tivity in mich a numoor of business concerns 
are primarily engaged. In determining 'Whether 
dominance exists, consideration shall be given 
to all appropriate factors, including volume of 
business, number of employees, financial resources, 
competitive status or position, ownership or con-
trol of materials, processes, patents and license 
agreements, facilities, sales territory, and nature 
of business activity." 
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Even if a canpany meets these requirements of size and dominance, 
it still will not be able to receive SBIC financing if it is en-
gaged in a prohibited business. Briefly, prohibited operations are 
agricultural concerns, relenders, those engaging in activities con-
trary to the public interest, sporadic or single project businesses, 
international trade, land speculations, passive businesses, sellers 
of alcoholic beverages, and a customer-vender financing relationship. 
While the provisions regarding the definition of a "snall 
business concern" for SBIC purposes may seem complex, virtually all 
of the companies applying for financing are able to qualify under the 
general size standards and the other provisions of Fonn 480. '!his 
Form must be filled out by the applicant and signed by both it and 
the SBIC and kept in the records of each. 
The second major incentive provided by Congress in at-
tracting funds to the SBIC program we not a part of the ~all Busi-
ness Investment Act of 1958, but was covered in the Technical Amend-
ments Act of 1958 which provided major tax advantages to SBICs in 
three areas. First, an investor in the stock of an SBIC will be al-
lowed an ordinary loss deduction rather than a capital loss deduction 
on losse e arising from worthlessness or sale of such stock. Secondly, 
an SBIC will be allowed an ordinary loss deduction, rather than a 
capital loss deduction, on lasses sustained on convertible debentures, 
including stock received pursuant to the conversion privilege. Fin-
ally, SBICs are allowed to deduct 100 percent of dividends received 
from a taxable domestic corporation rather than the 85 percent deduc-
tion allowd corporate taxpayers generally. 
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The first of these provisions, providing ordinary loss 
treatment for stooldlolders in SBICs, has proven to be effective 
inducement to the investment or funds in the program through both 
privately-owed and publicly-o,.,ned companies. This is particularly 
true of investors in high tax brackets. It was initially believed 
that this provision would apply only to original investors in SBICs, 
but the Internal Revenue Bureau extended the ordinary loss provision 
to all purchasers, whether original or not, in a ruling published in 
the Federal Register of January 28, 1960. 
The second or the three major tax provisions in the law, 
covering the ordinary loss treatment for losses sustained by an SBIC 
on convertible debentures and stock arising from conversion, is per-
haps the least understood of all the rules and regulations governing 
SBICs. It is generally believed that any loss taken by an SBIC or 
any of its investments can be taken as an ordinary loss against income. 
This is chfinitely not the case. The Technical Amendments Act was 
passed soon after the &all Business Investment Act or 1958 and pro-
vided for the ordinary loss treatment only on the type of equity in-
vestments parmi tted in the original legislation-convertible deben-
tures. Congress has not as yet amended the Internal Revenue Code 
to cover all types or investments made by an SBIC as parmi tted by 
the 1960 Amendments to the original legislation. Several. bUl.s pro-
viding the ordinary loss trea t.ment to all investments made by an 
SBIC have been filed in Congress since 1960, but none have passed. 
Senate Bill s. 903, 'Which was carried over from the previous session 
of the 87th Congress, died in committee at the close of the most 
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recant Congress. A new tax bill; s. 3736, ws introduced toward 
the end of the 87th Congress, and w.s carried over into the 88th 
Congress as Bill (S. 297, H. R. 583). The new bill generally covers 
the same material as s. 903 and briefly would: 
(1) Allow SB!Cs to sat up reserves for losses 
and bad debts equal to 20 percent of invest-
ments. The amounts reserved would be tax 
deductible. 
(2) Provide statutory exemption, rather than 
the present exemption by regulation only, 
fran the accumulated earnings tax of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
(3) Clarify the Internal Revenue Code section 
'\olhich deals with the personal holding com-
pany exemption afforded SB!Cs. 
(4) Allow all SBICs to qualify as regulated in-
vestment companies, whether or not registered 
'With the SEC. 
(5) Allow ordinary loss treatment on all equity 
se curi ties. 
In summary, the laws and regulations providing for the es-
tablishment and regulations of S3!Cs have received criticism tram a 
wide variety of sources. Sane of this criticism is undoubtedly just, 
as certain provisions of the law have prevented SBICs from carrying 
out their intended function of providing needed equity capital to 
small business concerns. Nevertheless, over $600 million in private 
funds have been attracted to the program over less than a five year 
period within this legal background. Therefore, while there may be 
a question over whether or not SBICs have been successfully fulfill-
ing their intended function, the presently and previously e:xisting 
lalo~s and regulations have provided a satisfactory frBlllawrk in at-
tracting adequate funds to the program. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF SBIC PROGRAM 
Although the Snall Business Investment Act of 1958 was 
passed in October of that year, it was not until March of 1959 
that the first licenses were issued by the SBA. In that month, 
the First Midwest Capital Corporation and The Citizens and South-
ern Capital Corporation, both bank-owned at the time and now publicly-
O\omed as well as bank related, received licenses; and the program 
was underway. 
It is to be expected that the program would start quite 
slowly. The machinery for processing propsals had to re established 
by a new division of the SBA, and individuals and organizations in-
terested in submitting proposals first bad to acquaint themselves 
with the provisions of the original legislation, the requirements 
of the proposal, and the numerous regulations refining procedures 
that were issued by the SBA. 
An applicant is required to subnit a comprehensive pro-
posal on an SBA form which includes basically all the ground rules 
under \.hich the proposed company intends to operate. After the 
proposal has been reviewed and approved by the SBA, a "notice to 
proceed" is issued; and, if all suggested changes are canplied with, 
a license is granted. The tlliie required for these steps varies with 
the backlog of proposals before the SBA, rut usually consumes three 
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to six months. The type of information required in the proposal 
is as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) {;) 
(6) 
{7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) (16) 
Name of proposed operator. 
Proposed location of principal office. 
Agent for cor1~spondence. 
Proposed capitalization. 
Source of initial capital and expansion 
plans. 
status of organization (information re-
garding availability of state charter). 
Area of operations. 
Need for proposed operator in the area. 
Plan of operations, (includes such items 
as operating officers, physical setup, con-
sulting fees, finder's fees, etc.) 
Policy (includes inves'bnent policies, to-
gether with proposed maximum interest charges). 
Management and control. 
Previous government financing. 
Small business investment company affiliations. 
_Family or financial interest of an SBA employee. 
Names of attorneys, accountants, etc. 
Declaration, (includes statement by proponents that 
they will comply with the law, SBA, etc.). 
In 1959, only 58 licenses were issued to the new SBICs under 
the then existing legislation and regulations. The great majority of 
these were minimum-sized with private ownership, or bank ownerShip. 
Several of these later wre successful in issuing shares of their 
stock to the public. As early as June, 1959, howver, a major public 
offering of the common stock of an SBIC was made when Electronics 
Capital Corporation successfully raised $18.7 million. This clearly 
indicated that . the general public had baeii made aware and w.s in-
terested in the new fozmal vehicle for venture capital investing. A 
few other SBIC s -were successful in issuing their stock to the public 
during the early months of the program, incluiing Allied SBIC, Greater 
Washington Industrial Investments, Inc. and First Midwst Capital Cor-
poration. Nevertheless, time was required to educate both undenJri tars 
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and the public as to the value of SBIC common stocks as investments. 
During this period, there were a few unsuccessful. underwri tinge--
Tennessee Investors and Southern Growth Industries, Inc., among them. 
It ws not until lata in 1961 that public underwritings of SBICs 
encountered difficulties again. 
By May 30, 1960, there were still only one hundred li-
censed SBICs with total capital of less than $6o million, and with 
less than one-half of their capital invested in the securities of 
small business concerns. The program began to gather momenttnn with 
the passage of 1960 Amendments to the originating legislation. The 
amendments removed a number of significant roadblocks which wra hinder-
ing the organization and operation of SBICs, as well as clarifying a 
ntnnb3r of points mich were subject to various interpretations. Under 
a clearer and mora favorable set of rules under which to operate, the 
rata of SBIC applications and licenses began to accelerate. Over 
the remaining months of 1960, the SBA issued 75 licenses, bringing 
the total issued during the year to 147 and over-all at year end to 
175. In addition, a sizeable backlog of apPlications for licenses 
gegan to build up. 
During 1960, the second major impetus to the growth of the 
SBIC industry also began to appear. Not only were SBICs able to suc-
cessf'ul.ly market public issues o:f their conmon stock, but the shares be-
gan to move upward both quickly and sharply in the over-the-counter 
market reflecting the speculative enthusiasm at the time for glamour 
stocks and new issues. The common stock of Electronics Capital Cor-
poration moved up to a market price of $28 3/4 during 1960, fran its 
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offering price of $10 per share. In May, June, and July, several 
sizeable new issues were brought to market including $10 million 
offerings by Growth Capital, Inc. and The Franklin Corporation of 
New York. In September, 1960, Boston Capital Corporation was suo-
ca ssful in raising $22.; million. This remains the largest single 
issue brought to market by an SBIC to date. 
The third major factor behind the rapid expansion of the 
SHC program in 1960 was the well-publicized success which certain 
SBICs had with a few of the early investments. Perhaps the best 
known ware the investment of Electronics Capital Corporation in Potter 
Instruments and the investment of Greater vlashington Industrial In-
vestments, Inc. in CEIR Inc. These resulted in the realization or 
substantial capital gains by the SBICs concerned, through the public 
offerings of the stock of the small business concern, which wre wall-
publici z.ad in the investment connnunity. This contributed undoubtedly 
to the rapid rise in the price of SHC connnon stocks and substan-
tially enhanced the market for new SBIC public underwritings. 
Canbining with the improvement in the operating environ-
ment of SBICs through the 1960 Amendments, the success and strong 
after market of SBIC public offerings, and the publicity given highly-
successful SBIC portfolio investment s; the fabulous success of the 
new issue market enabled the S3IC program to expand rapidly through-
out 1961.17 In all, 273 licenses were issued by the SBA during the 
year. 
17 Infra, Chapter VII 
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The historical peak to date in the influx of' capital 
into the program occurred in July, August, and September of' 1961. 
During that three month period, $1.32 million was raised. Public 
issues by twlve companies accounted for 8.3 percent of' the total. 
or $110 million. 
TABLE 1 
PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SBIC 
COMMON STOCKS 
JULY-SEPTEMBER 1961 
Month Canpanx Amount 
(1961) (ooo,ooo) 
July Electronics Capital Corp. $ 16.5 
July Southeastern Capital Corp. 6 • .3 
July Capital for Technical Industries s.o 
July Capital Southwest Corp. 14.3 
July First SBIC of New Jersey .3.7 
July Science Capital Corp. 4.0 
August Business Trends, Inc. 19.2 
August Gulf'-Southwst Capital Corp. 16 • .3 
September Florida Capital Corp. 7.0 
September Texas Capital Corp. .3.1 
September Central Investment Corp. of Denver 6.4 
September Drug & Food Capital Corp. $116:~ 
It is interesting to note that the size of the individual 
public offerings in September was significantJ..y smaller than those 
in the t'WO previous months. This is attributed to the 1961 Amend-
$ 52.8 
.35.5 
21.2 $110.2 
mants to the Act vhich appeared to sharply limit the size of invest-
menta Ylhich an SBIC could make, as well as market conditions. It 
began to appear that the market t,18.s becoming over-saturated by SBIC 
issues. Several nev SBIC issues wre selling oolov their offering 
prices. Fifteen SBICs wre successful in raising their initial public 
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:fUnds in the period between September, 1961, and May, 1962. All 
but four of these were marketed by March, When the new issue market 
began to show definite signs of weakness. Puerto Rico Capital, De-
velopers S13IC, La Salle Street Capital and Carolinas Capital Cor-
poration, the latter being the last SBIC to raise funds from the 
general public, barely beat the May, 1962, stock market collapse 
with successful offerings. Each issue subsequently fell -well b3low 
the offering price. The fact that, with one exception, there has 
not b3en a public issue of an SBIC stock in over a year, and the lack 
of recovery of SBIC stock prices, testifies to the prevailing dis-
favor of the industry within the investment community. 
TABLE 2 
SBIC L ICEN S!:sJ-8 
DECEMBER .31, 1962 
Licensed in 1959 58 
Licensed in 196o 117 
Licensed in 1961 27.3 
Licensed in 1962 216 
Total Licenses Issued 664 
Less: Licenses Terminated 25 
Active SBICs at December .31, 1962 / 6.39 
While publicly-ovned SBICs control the bulk of the capital 
in the program to date, the privataly-Ol.med S3ICs dominate the in-
dustry numerically. Approximately one-half of the privately-o~d 
SBICs are associated with other organizations or institutions. The 
18 
Richard E. Kelley, The SBIC National Directo;z Keyfax 
Publications, Inc., Los Angeles, 1963. 
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remaining half is canposed of private individuals of 'Widely vary-
ing backgrounds who, attracted by the readily available and rela-
tively inexpensive SBA fWtds as wll as the tax incentives, are 
seeking capital gains through venture capital investments. The 
usual privately-owed SBIC without any business affiliations will 
characteristically be of minim:mn size ($300,000), azrl will have 
the appearance in operations of a sophisticated investment club 
with each member contributing something to the group fran his 
technical, business or inves1:ment background. Despite the problems 
which this type of SBIC has encountered to date,l9 it continues to 
predominate numerically within the industry. 
TABLE 3 
SBIC OWNERmip20 
DECEMBER 31, 1961 
.'r.u!! 
Publicly-Owned 
Bank Related 
(Not including 2; bank related firms 
listed as publicly-owned) 
Wholly Owned 
Partially Owned 
Bank Managed-May be 
Partially Owned 
Privately-Owned 
21 
18 
21 
Total 
47 
60 
532 
639 
The originators of the SBIC legislation anticipated the 
banks would want to participate in the program and took steps to 
19 Infra, Chapter VI 20Ibid p. 235 _,, 
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include them in the enabling legislation. Section 302 of the SI3IC 
Act provided that: 
"Shares of stock in such campania s (SBICs) may 
be purchased by member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System and by nonmember insured banks. A member bank 
or an insured nonmem bar bank may hold stock in such 
companies only in an aggregate amount of 1 percent of 
such bank's capital and surplus." 
The 1 percent limitation was raised to 2 percent of capital and 
surplus by the 1961 Amendments. 
It is not surprising that the banking profession has taken 
a prominent position among SBIC interests. Commercial banks have the 
availabUi ty of qualified personnel, a ready-made source of pros-
pacts and the low overhead ne eessary to efficiently operate an SBIG. 
Furthermore, an interest in an SBIC pr€lvides a new avenue for estab-
lishing banking relationships, a satisfactory public relations tool, 
and a source of profits to the bank. Through December 31, 1962, 285 
banks were known to have various relationships 'With 85 individual 
SBICs.21 The relationships include complete ownership, majority owner-
ship, minority ownership in both publicly and privately held SBICs 
and management positions. Bank-related SBICs are believed to represent 
over 35 percent of the total investment in !mall business concerns 
made by SBICs since the beginning of the program. Among the nation's 
leading banks in the SBIC program are the Bank of America and Chase 
Manhattan Bank, mich rank first and second respectively in size in 
the banking industry. The majority of the banks have preferred to 
21 
Ibid.' pp. 237-44. 
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limit their interest to a minority position although several have 
maintained Wholly-o~med SBIC subsidiaries. 
TABlE 4 
BANKS WITH WHOLLY-OWNED SBIC SUBSIDIARIES 
IECEMBER, 1962 
Bank 
-
Bank of America 
Chase Manhattan Bank (N.Y.) 
Connnerce Trust Company (K.C.) 
First Bank stock Corp. (Minn.) 
First National Bank (Boston) 
First National Bank (Chicago) 
First National Bank (Dallas) 
First National Bank & Trust Co. 
(Oklahoma City) 
Forth Worth National Bank (Texas) 
Security First National Bank (~.A.) 
Society National Bank (Cleve.) 
Third National Bank (Nashville) 
Wisconsin Bankshares Corp. 
(Milwaukee) 
Capital 
Small Business $ 3,000,000 
Enterprises 
Chase Manhattan 
Capital Carp. 3,000,000 
Comtrusco Investment 
Can.pany 800,000 
First Bank stock Equity 
Corporation l,ooo,ooo 
First SBIC of N.E. 1,000,000 
First Capital Corp. 
of Chicago 3,000,000 
First Dallas Capital 
Corporation 1,500,000 
First Oklahana 
Capital Corp. 
Tarrant Capital Corp. 
First SBIC of Calif. 
Capital Funds Corp. 
The Third 1 s SBIC 
First Wisconsin In-
305,000 
400,000 
1,000,000 
300,000 
305,000 
Vestment Corp. 300.000 
TOTAL $15,910,000 
Banks were among the first institutions or businesses 
to evidence any interest in the SBIC program. It became readily 
apparent to other financial institutions that an SBIC would be a 
natural adjunct to their operations; and several COliDDeroial finance 
organizations and savings and loan institutions subsequently entered 
the field. OVer the past year real estate and construction interests 
have been the most prominent outside groups forming SBICs as a vehicle 
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to further participate in the real estate market through financing 
of corporations mich develop or acquire real estate. Approximately 
one-third of all SBICs are connected with real estate interests either 
through the background of their officers, and/or the nature of their 
investment program. 
TABLE 5 
SHC MANAGEMENT22 
SEPTEMBER .30, 1962 
Affiliation ar Background of 
Chief Executive Tota1 % 
1) General Business 157 25.4 
2) Real Estate, Construction or 
Mortgage Loan lll 18.0 
.3) Banking 57 9.2 
4) Law 50 8.1 
5) Investment Banking or other 
Securities Specialization 48 7.8 
6) Specialists in the SBIC Field 
of Specialization 48 7.8 
~~ Commercial Finance or Savings and Loan 4.3 7.0 Varied Financial Background .35 5.7 
9) Mana~ment Consulting 24 .3.9 
10) Accounting 20 .3.2 
11) Unclassified A_ J.2 
TOTAL 617 .100.0% 
Special interest groups participating in the formation and 
operations of SBICs are not limited to the financial world. Other 
businesses have used SBICs as a successful vehicle to assist cus-
tomers and for merger and acquisition purposes~ A wide range of 
special interest groups is represented in the program including 
22 SBIC New Developments, Keyfax Publications, Inc., Los 
Angeles, November .30, 1962, p. 1.377. 
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Wholesalers to assist retailers, bottlers to aid soft drink manu-
facturers, and a number of miscellaneous manufacturers for a variety 
of purposes. 
TABLE 6 
SELECTED OWNERS OF PRIVATE SBIC INTERESTs23 
(WHOLLY-OR PARTIALLY-OWNED) 
Owner 
Allehgany Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. 
American Guaranty Corp. 
Best Fertilizer Co. 
Coral Ridge Properties 
Fidelity Bank & Mortgage Co. 
Industrial Credit Co., Inc. 
Isbrandtsen & Co., Inc. 
(A shipping firm) 
Lone Star Wholesale Grocery 
Lytton Financial Corp. 
(A savings and Loan holding co.) 
Meade Electric Co. 
Palomar Mortgage Co. 
Prestige, Inc. 
(A textile Manufacturer) 
Top-of-the-World Farm & Equipment Co. 
Thorp Finance Corp. 
United Pacific Corp. 
(An insurance holding company) 
Beverage Capital Corp. 
Union Capital Corp. 
Agri-Supply Finance Co. 
First Financial Corp. 
Southern SBIC, Inc. 
Intermountain Capital Inc. 
Battery SBIC 
So-Tex Investment Co. 
Lytton SBIC, Inc. 
Mid.i.North Capital Corp. 
Palamar Capital Corp. 
Prestige Capital Carp. 
PennaCle Investment Corp. 
Thorp SBIC 
Pacific S3IC 
The growth rate of the privately-owned SBICs has paralleled 
that of the publiCly-owed entities and has doubtless been infiuanced 
by the latter. The interest generated in the formation of private 
SBICs has been dependent upon the factors 'Which have detennined the 
market acceptability of publiCly-owned SBICs. As the new issue market 
for ffiiC stocks has been virtually non-existent since May, 1962, pri-
vately-o'WD.ed SBICs have provided the bulk of the capital added to the 
23The SBIC NaticnaJ_ Direetor:r, Kelley, p. 249 
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program over the past fifteen months. Nevertheless, the publicly-
owned SBICs continue to represent approximately two-thirds of the 
total funds of ell SBICs. 
While it is not possible to obtain the amount of funds 
invested by SBICs, it is generally believed that approximately 50 
percent to 60 percent of the total funds in the program are presently 
invested or ccmnitted to SillBll business concerns. This percentage 
has remained fairly constant since the beginning of the program, as 
the rate of addition of eapi tal to the program has matched the rate 
of investments. The lack of full investment has led to the criti-
cism that there are excess funds in the program and that there are 
too many SBICs which will result in 1mdue competition. However, 
the bulk of the unconmitted funds are usua.lly found in the recently 
formed SBICs ~ich have not had sufficient time in which to invest 
their i'tmds. 
SBIC fonnation has tended to concentrate aromd the ex-
isting centers of venture capital in the oomtry. Therefore, there 
is a highly unequal distribution of SBICs among states. As of 
September 30, 1962, nine states - California (88), Connecticut (2e), 
Florida (29), IDinois (28), Massachusetts (36), NewJersey (19), 
New York (105), Pennsylvania (30), and Texas (58) -accounted far 
4].3 of the SBICs in the program, representing 67 percent of the 
total. There are fifteen states ¥ilich have either none or one SBIC 
incorporated there. 
In stJPmB.rY, the SBIC program has been successful in at-
tracting sufficient funds from a wide variety of sources to invest 
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in the securities of sn.all business concerns. The ability of SBICs 
to raise funds in the public market has parmi tted the SBA to hold 
the percentage of Govermnent participation to a dollar minimum, wall 
balo11r earlier expectations. In general, although there are undoub-
tedly numerous SBICs whose pre senee is doing damage to the industry, 
the large num.oor of prominent individuals and institutions partici-
pating in the SBIC program have lent it considerable stature to the 
extent that President Kennedy has cited it as having the potential 
to oocoma the Fourth Banking System in the nation.24 
~essage to annual conference of the National Association 
of Sna.ll Business Investment Canpanies, December, 1962. 
CHAPTER V 
INVESTMENT PHlLOOOPHIES OF SBICs 
There are an estimated 4.5 million small businesses in 
the United States which are eligible for SBIC investment. By the 
end of 196Z, over 5,000 of them had received assistance from the 
industry. The large majority of these companies are regarded as 
so-called "growth" companies, manufacturers whoEB products are ex-
pected to show a rapid gain in sales and earnings over the years. 
The .type of investment required for companies of this nature is 
venture capital, and therefore SBICs are usually referred to as 
venture capitalists. 
The tenn "venture capital" implies a large degree of 
risk. In order to canpensate for this existing risk, a high po-
tential return on the investment must be foreseen. The requirement 
of consistency, or at least an apparent consistency, between the 
investment potential and the degree of risk involved, rules out 
the vast majority of small business concerns as likely SBIC pros-
pects. SBICs are not financing the corner drug store or restaurant, 
as many expected they would, as this type of investment is just not 
feasible as the risks involved and operating headaches generally far 
out-weigh the profit potential. In addition, few SBICs have financed 
newly-organized companies as the risks involved in such an enter-
prioo are usually too great to assume. 
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The great bulk of SBIC funds are invested in companies 
"hose prospects for growth are favorable due to any nmnoor of rea-
sons. Prior to the sharp decline of the stock market in May, 1962, 
most of the sa companies were so-called "glamour" stocks in the 
"glamour" industries such as electronics, discount stores, leisure 
time, data processing, and various research and development areas. 
Since the stock market shakeout, companies in mora prosaic indus-
tries such as metal fabricating and construction are receiving more 
attention, as the "glamour" stocks remain in general investment dis-
favor. In the first two or three years of the progt-am, SBICs wre 
closely associated with the electronics industry due to the prepon-
derance of investments in that area through the coinciding of the 
boom stages of growth in the development of both industries, and 
the early well-publicized success of Electronics Capital Corporation 
lrilich specializes in this field. This correlation was refiected in 
the subsequent market action of SBIC and the electronic company co~ 
mon stocks. Howver, a recent survey25 of SBIC investments by in-
dustry ranks electronics third in importance oohind real estate and 
retail outlets, although those polled felt that the electronics in-
dustry would b9 their most important industry for future investments. 
Today, the typical investment portfolio of a diversified venture capi-
tal SBIC covers a vast variety of industrial acti vi ties. This diver-
si ty of investment has prompted the statement that no two SBICs are 
alike. 
25 Are SBICs Doing Their Jobs, Samuel L. Hayes and Donald H. 
Woods, Harvard Business Review, Volume 41, No. 2, p. 188. 
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Although the majority of SBIC s are broadly based with 
widely diversified portfolios, approximately 20 percent have one 
or more specialties. These canpanies range from the large publicly-
owned concerns such as Boston Capital, Electronics Capital, and 
Greater Washington Industrial Investments, 'Which have limited them-
selves to applying capital to technical and scientific enterprises, 
to the smaller highly-specialized privately-o'WD.ed SBICs. Among the 
latter group are Lowcountry Investment Corporation, which special-
izes in company reorganizations; and Recreation Capital, Grocers 
Investment Corporation, Health Capital Corporation, Beverage Capital 
Corporation, and Developers , SBIC, whose specialty interests are self-
explanatory. 
The most common area for specialization of SBICs is in the 
field of real estate. Approximately one-third of the existing SBICs 
have expressed an interest in investing in real estate, nearly one-
half have made at least one real estate investment and over a dozen 
invested only in real estate ventures. The .SBIC industry has proven 
to be an important new source of equity funds for the real estate 
field. Furthermore, real estate investing is becoming more popular 
with SB!Cs as the opportunities for "glamour" stock investments have 
become fewer and considerably reduced in attractiveness. The per-
centage of SBIC funds invested represented by real estate is steadily 
increasing as the industry assists in easing the shortage of equity 
funds to finance the continuing building boom. SBICs are inherently 
attracted to the field as venture capitalists through opportunities 
, in a wide variety of types of both new and existing buildings and 
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through highly leveraged investments with a high degree of both se-
curity and liquidity. 
The SBICs which concentrate their investments in techni-
cally oriented or research and development fields are the second 
largest group of specialty SBICs. Other important areas of speciali-
zation are consumer products, retailers, the oil and gas industries, 
the food industry and service industries. The degree of specializa-
tion covers a "torl.de area with standard SBIC, Inc., 'Which specializes 
in cemetary development companies, being perhaps the most unusual. 
A large numb:lr of SBICs have expressed an interest in a 
particular field, but the major portion of their portfolio is invested 
in a broad range of industries, and hence they are not defined as 
specialists. Several of these originally planned to specialize in a 
certain area but found that sufficient opportunities for investment 
\lOre not available and were forced to diversify. Drug and Food Capital 
Corporation, a publicly-owned SBIC with $4 million in assets, found 
that opportunities were too restricted in these two fields and sub-
sequently broadened its field of activities as the new corporate name 
adopted in 1962, Advance Growth Industries, indicates. In addition, 
the Directors of Water Industries Capital Corp., with assets of approxi-
mately $5 million, have recently follo1-ad the reconnnendation of stock-
holders to dissolve the company due to the lack of satisfactory opportuni-
ties for inve stmant within its field of interest. 
Whether specialized or broadly diversified~ the vast major-
ity of SBICs are venture capitalists. As such, they attempt to obtain 
their profits from long-term capital gains rather than from current 
- 39 -
income. This requires that the investment form utilized provide 
the SBIC ,.d. th an equity interest in the snall business concer. The 
amount of the equity interest 'Will vary considerably with the size 
of the investment and the degree of risk. It should be remembered 
that the primary interest of an SBIC is in making profits rather 
than obtaining control of a small business concern through a majority 
interest. It is possible for our SBIC to control over 50 percent of 
the stock interest of a small business concern under certain circum-
stances. However, the SBA w.lll usually require that the equity po-
sition be reduced below 50 percent over a period of time through a 
predetermined program. 
The type of security utilized by an SBIC in obtaining an 
equity interest varies considerably. As was indicated earlier, un-
til the 1%0 .Amendments, SBICs were permitted to obtain equity inter-
ests only through the use of convertible debentures. While this ve-
hicle remains the most popular security due primarily to its tax 
advantage, purchases of debentures with warrants or options, co:nnnon 
stock, or convertible preferred stock, and any combination of the 
above vdth each other, or with straight loans, are quite common. 
type of security bas its relative advantages and disadvantages. 
Each 
It 
appears that an equity debenture, either with warrants or convertible, 
is best sui ted for SBIC investment as it provides current income as 
~~11 as the potential of capital gains. Since the market collapse in 
early 1962, few SBICs are making direct investments in the connnon 
stocks of small business concerns because of the inability to bring 
even highly successful companies through a public underltll"i ting and 
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the growing awareness of the part of SB!Cs of the need for current 
income upon w.hich to exist. 
A glance at the portfolios of several of the larger SB!Cs 
indicates that once a certain type of security is adopted for invest-
ment purposes, it is usually utilized consistently. For example, Capi-
tal Southwst Corporation generally purchases , convertible debentures, 
Business Funds, Inc., SBIC of New York, Midland Capital and Narragan-
sett Capital prefer a combination of common stock and notes, Advance 
Growth Capital uses notes with warrants, Boston Capital generally uses 
stock and convertible debentures, and Electronics Capital Corporation 
and Central Investment Corporation prefer notes and equity debentures. 
The tYPe of security utilized is generally determined by individual 
management preference, consistent with over-all investment policy. 
The nonnal term of debt securities usually ranges betwen 
five and ten years. Only rarely does the term of an SBIC debt ex-
ceed ten years, and less than one percent exceed fifteen years, as, 
except in usual circumstances, a five to seven years period should 
provide a small business concern adequate time in 'Which to prosper. 
The other provisions covered in the indenture agreement, other than 
the basic terms covering interest rate, percentage of equity and re-
payment schedule usually include board membership, additiona debt, 
working capital restrictions, dividend and salary limitations, life 
insurance coverage for the principals, dilution protection and terms 
of future stock offerings. 
Medium to larger investments are preferred by most SHCs as 
there is little more expense involved in making the following a $10,000 
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investment as there is in servicing an $100,000 one due to econ-
ornie s of size. The most desirable range is perhaps betwen $50,000 
and $200,000. Snall business concerns in need of funds of this mag-
nitude are usually fairly well advanced .from their formation period 
and require additional funds for expansion, rather than firms in an 
earlier stage of development with less wll defined prospects and 
heavily dependent upon one or t"WO key individuals. Many SBICs do 
advertise that no investment is too small for their purpooos. Few, 
howver, have actually made investments of less than $100,000 in 
size. 
The smount of an SBIC's capitalization is a prima detenni-
nant of investment policy. By law, without approval of the SBA, an 
SBIC is limited to investing 20 percent of its capital and surplus 
in any one small business concern. This restriction in i tsalf is 
not considered to oo a serious handicap as it permits investments 
of $60,000 by even a minimum sized SBIC and portfolio diversifica-
tion is generally considered to be desirable. 
The $500,000 maximum limitation on a single investment by 
one SBIC, imposed by the 1961 Amendmants, which has ooen interpretated 
through SBA Regulations to apply only where 50 percent of the total 
number of investments made exceeds $500,000, is considered to be a more 
serious problem by the larger SBICs. Since a number of the larger 
SBICs had made the majority of their investments in units of $500,000 
or more prior to the effective date of the regulation (October 3, 
1961), it in effect in most cases restricts.:investments to the $500,000 
limitation. However, the majority remain in a position to make 
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investments, with SBA approval, above that amount. Nevertheless, 
only Greater Washington Industrial Investments, Inc. and Tachno 
Fund, Inc. have asked and received permission to make investm:mts 
e xceeding the amount. Therefore, from a practical viewpoint, the 
$500,000 limitation has been effective. 
The SBIC industry actually brought the $500,000 limita-
tion upon itself. Too many SBICs made well-advertised investments 
of $1 million or more without considering their political implica-
tions. Congress intended the SBIC program to be an asset to the 
"small" businesemen, not one that was in a position to attain an 
investment of $500,000 or more in his business. Criticism was 
forthcoming, and the legiSlation was inevitable. 
One means of circumventing the restrictions placed upon 
the size of investments is through the use of participat ion or syn-
dicate financing, through Wbich an SBIC combines with ot her inves-
tors in providing financing. SBIC participations are most frequent 
with other SBICs, however, private venture capite~ firms, insurance 
companies and investment banking houses are often found to be partners 
with an SBIC or a group of s:I!Cs in an investment. The obvious advan-
tage of syndication is that it increases the mnnoor and size of in-
vestment opportunities available to SBICs. It also enables the in-
vesting group to pool its various special individual talents in 
making and follOl·dng the investment. The major disadvantage arises 
from the difficulty in maintaining harmony within the syndicate con-
cerning the normal problems that arise in venture capital investing. 
As more and more SBICs are utilizing syndicates, the advantages 
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apparently outwigh·. the disadvantages. The only SBA Begulation cov-
ering participations provides that no more than five SBICs may par-
ticipate in an investment of $500,000 or mora. If the amount is less 
than that, any number may participate in any amount subject to the 20 
percent of capital and surplus restriction. 
While the vast majority of SBICs are venture eapits~ists 
making equity investments, there exists a small minority 'Which are 
the so-called "term lenders". The represent approximately 10 percent 
of the existing SBICs in numoor and a snaller percentage of the capi-
tal in the program. The term lenders are largely minimtnn capital 
SBICs and are affiliates of a parent orgailiz.ation mich is interes-
ted in making investments in firms within its field of interest. 
There are generally few formal ties between the small business con-
cern and the term lender SEne, with the arrangement quite similar to 
that existing ootl<een a conmercial bank and its customers. In view of 
the absence of an equity bite, the interest rates on the straight loans 
are considerably higher than those of equity debentures, usually running 
around 12 percent. The only publicly-owned SBIC which is exclusively 
a term lender is the First Connecticut SBIC. 
In concluding a discussion of the investment philosophies 
and policies of SBICs, it must be stressed that venture capital in-
vestment is in essence one in epople and/or ideas. Regardless of the 
peculiar investment objectives or vehicles of an SBIC, its success in 
the long run will 1:e primarily determined by its success in correctly 
evaulating the profit potential of its individual investments. 
CHAPI'ER VI 
OPERATlliG CHARACTERISl'ICS OF PRIVATELY-OWNED SBICs 
The prime determinant of the differing operating char-
acteristics between privately-ovmed and publicly-owned SBICs, 
which will be covered in Chapters VI and VII, is size. Only eight-
een of the sixty-five SBICs with assets of $1 million or over, as 
of December .31, 1962, wre not publicly-owned. All forty-seven of 
the publicly-oll.ned SBICs had assets of $1 million or more. The 
vast majority of the privately-owned SBICs are of minimum asset 
size--$300,000-with very few ldth assets exceeding $500,000. 
Various studies of the industry made over the past tiD 
or three years indicate that an SBIC with assets of less than $1 
million is at a serious disadvantage in competing with its larger 
brethren in operating successfully. Virtually all of the disadvan-
tages stem from the relatively high costs of operating a small SBIC, 
or are inherent in the actual lack of capital itself. 
Undoubtedly, the rush to establish SBICs in 1960 and 1961 
attracted many people with funds to the SBIC program that were not 
qualified in the financial field and have proven inept in venture 
capital investing. Indeed, management problems rather than shortage 
of capital are believed to oo the industry's principal operating 
problem. For the small privately-owned SBIC, ownership and manage-
ment are generally identical as the costs of maintaining a staff or 
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even one individual manager on a full-time basis, have proven to 
be prohibitive. Usually the minimum-si7.ed SBIC is owed by a 
group of i..11.dividuals with various talents 'Which they contribute 
to the operation on a part-time basis. 
It is wiversally agreed that part-time management of a 
SBIC is ineffective. In order to attain additional IJlBllagement 
strength, many SBICs have relied upon outside consultants for both 
technical and financial assistance. Here again, however, financial 
limitations prevent any more than part-time assistance. To offset 
the disadvantages of the lack of full-time management, it was the 
feeling of several SBICs that it 1-rould be advantageous to combine 
with one another to hire a fUll-time manager to represent the inter-
est of several SBICs. However, in August, 1961, SBA regulations "~re 
issued which stated that an officer or director of one SBIC may not 
be an officer or director of another, in line with anti-trust and 
anti-monopoly provisions of other Government departments. 
The problems of inadequate management generally do not 
apply to the non-public SBIC s l-lhicb are either bank-omed or are 
captive organizations controlled by an operating parent company. 
Here, Where generally the SBIC is primarily an extension of the op-
erations of the parent in a specieli2.ed field, management is experi-
enced and well-qualfified through the utilization of various officers 
of the parent organization. This is particularly true of the affili-
ated term lenders, but usually true for the various corporations 
which specialize in venture capital in a particular field as well. 
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The pressures of inadequate income and capital 'With ~Ihich to operate 
ere also usually not a problem of the affiliated snail SBIC as the 
parent organization can easily absorb the operating overhead of the 
SBIC as well as supplying additional capital if and when required. 
When one examines the income statement of a minimum-siz.ed 
SBIC, it is easy to see the financial difficulties encountered in 
operations. First, it should be stressed that 90 percent of the 
minimum-sized SBICs have obtained one-half of their $300,000 capi-
tal in the form of 5 percent SBA term loans (Section 302 (a)). This 
establishes immediately an annual interest expense of $7,500 before 
any funds are invested. SBIC investments provide income on invested 
assets in a range from 0 percent to 15 percent depending upon the 
type' of recurity utilized. The median, hov.'ever, is S percent. Based 
upon the median interest rate, a minimum-sized SBIC has a potential 
gross operating income from investments of $24,000. In actual prac-
tice, however, the industry has bean only 50 percent to 60 percent 
invested at any one time. Therefore, a typical minimum-sized SBIC 
would have annual gross inco:roo of only $12,000. This provides very 
little coverage of the $7,500 interest requirement without considera-
tion of operating expenses such as officers' salaries, directors' fees, 
office expenses, investigation and financial service costs, travel, 
insurance, legal services, audit and examination costs and ta%es. In 
view of this situation, it is not surprising that the SBICs with 
assets under $1 million have collectively operated at a loss since 
the formation of the program and none have paid dividends to their 
stoCkholders from aurrent income. 
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Jn addition to the problems of inadequate management and 
lack of adequate income, a SBIC with assets of less than $1 million 
encounters other serious operating problems such as the restriction 
of investment opportunities through lack of adequate contacts, in-
ability to invest outside of a limited geographical area, and failure 
to provide close supervision of investments made. 
More important are the limitations placed upon investment 
policies and procedures by a limited capital base. First, a SBIC 
is limited to regulation to investing 20 percent of its funds in any 
one snall business concern. Therefore, the maximum investment per-
missible a minimum-sized SBIC is $60,000. As few SBICs have made 
investments in less than $50,000 units, the total numb:lr of invest-
ments rarely exceeds six. Thus diversification, an important in-
gredient in, successful venture capital investing, is strictly limited. 
In addition, a minimum-sized SBIC is severely hampered by the 20 per-
cent restriction in providing the follow-up funds that are often es-
sential to the successful growth of a small business concern. After 
initially dealing with a minim1Dl'l-sized rnrc, a snall business concern 
is quite frequently required to seek subsequent cash requirements 
elsewhere regardless of the condition and prospects of the company 
concerned. 
A SBIC is required to maintain unimpaired capital. at sJ.l 
times. An impairment of capital is considered to have occurred upon 
a deficit from operations amounting to 50 percent of net worth;": not 
including loans from the SBA. Therefore, a minimum-sized SBIC with 
$150,000 of private funds would have impaired capital upon the 
accumulation of $75,000 in losses. This would have to be corrected 
or the SBA wuld take over the SBIC 1.s assets in OO.nkruptcy. Thus 
far, only one SBIC ( Dynamic Capital Corporation ) has gone into 
bankruptcy, although others are certain to follow in the normal 
course of venture capital investing. Experience to date has indi-
cated that investments that turn out to be unprofitable usually make 
themselves apparent before those are eventually favorable may be so 
defined. This will prove to be a serious disadvantage to minimum-
si zed SBICs that must maintain an unimpaired capital position ~le 
"'>Tai ting for their successful investments to result in the realization 
of cash profits. 
In view of the problems inherent in the operations of an 
SBIC 'With assets of less than $1 million, most companies are anxious 
to expand their capital base. Several avenues for growth are theo-
retically open including (1) borrovdng, (2) merger, (3) private sale 
of stock, and (4) public sale of stock. From a practical vie\o1p0ilit~ 
only (2) merger, is currently available. While SBICs are legally 
permitted to borro¥r four times their capital base from any source, 
only the large publicly-owed companies and those affiliated with a 
lending institution are in a position to borrow funds. A portfolio 
of venture capital investments is not a satisfactory borro"tdng base. 
Private sale of common stock is extremely difficult to accomplish 
under present circumstances in vie w of the present market prices of 
SBICs. Interested investors would be more inclined to put their funds 
into publicly-ovmed companies, presently available at substantial 
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discounts from book values, than to purchase stock in privately-
ow.ed companies at 100 percent of book value. Finally, a public 
underwriting of a new SBIC has not been feasible since the spring 
of 1962. 
Although several. SBICs have indicated an interest in mer-
ging to provide an adequate capital base for operations, fewmergers 
have been consummated to date. Numerous difficulties are encountered 
in attempting to arrive at satisfactory valuations of portfolios and 
blending investment philosophies and policies, in addition to the red 
tape involved in obtaining SBA ~pproval. Nevertheless, mergers are 
a logical solution to the problems of a minimum-sized SBIC and several 
are expected to occur on an annual basis in the future. 
Through December 31, 1962, twnty-five SBICs had terminated 
operations and relinquished their licenses. Only one of these -
Electro-Science Investors, Inc. - 'WB.S publicly-owned, the remainder 
being all privately-o'Wiled campania s. The principals reasons cited 
for dropping out of the program were (1) inadequate fUnds, (2) inability 
to find suitable investments, and (3) inability to operate on a prof-
itable basis. i0.1 three are inter-related as earlier indicated. Un-
doubtedly, the number of drop-outs would have been considerably higher 
e xcept for the regula.tions governing the issuance of licenses, which, 
although incurring considerable abuse because of the lengthy infor-
mation and tilne required, tmdoubtedly prevented cormtle ss rmquali-
fied persons from entering the progt"am. The principal complaint of 
privately-owned SBICs with the regulations, concerns the maximum 
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amount of Government funds available to them. Few, however, are 
presently in a position to utilize additional funds as present 
funds are not fully invested except in rare instances. 
In conclusion, in studying the operating characteris-
tics of privately-owned SBICs, one is constantly encomtering the 
problems which are inherent in their operation. These are well 
summari:r.ad in a portion of the Statement of Arthur R. Cuss, Presi-
dent to Dynsmic Capital Corporation before the Snall Business 
Committee of the u. s. Senate on March 16, 1962, vlhich reads as 
follm.rs: 
tt I do not think you can survive as a minimum 
size company in the equity field. In many cases 
the SBICs that operate as a straight loan house 
are an extension of an established lending or-
ganization. The SBIC represents just another 
source of funds, and can 1:e run out of a desk 
dra.l<2r. This is not true of the equity oriented 
SBIC. You will find yourself spending 90 percent 
of your time with present investments. You must 
watch, aid, and help the companies or make ar-
rangements for some qualified person to do this. 
There is an old Spanish proverb that translated, 
says 1'The eye of the Haster makes the horse fat. 11 
With equity investments you are buying futures. 
You do not have present value• Advice and aid 
are like sprinkling water and fertilizer on a lavm, 
the grass comes up faster, stronger and greener. 
You cannot sit back from one point in time and say 
11 I made a good investment. 11 This attitude is a 
luxury that neither an SBIC or a canpany can af-
ford. You must push. People who will and are 
capable of supplying the help required are expen-
sive. .And one man, if he is to think '~11, can 
only do so much. But ~ as a practical matter--with 
a minimum SBIC you cannot afford to spend much 
time with your inve s'bnents be cause of direct out-
of-pocket costs. In a minimum equity SBIC you do 
not have the money coming in. A situation that re-
quires up to $60,000 in the majority of cases cannot 
SUpport the fees or charges for time spent at cost. 
They cannot support you now and chances are that if 
your hoped for expansion of these companies come to 
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pass, they will continue to require capital. 
Even if you are fully invested at S percent, 
you simply cannot generate the income to stay 
alive Yhile you wait for capital gains. If 
the company requires more capital you cannot 
invest it yoursalf but must attempt to induce 
other investors to go along with you. This 
may or may not be possible. If you are "all 
equity," I think you need between a million 
and two million dollars to bra ak even on op-
erations. You cannot do it on less. You must 
have sufficient capital to weather the storms 
of loss-and you will have them. The bad sit-
uations get worse faster than the good ones get 
readY to turn over or arrive at a· position Yhere 
money can be t aken out. AlJL this does not mean 
that an SBIC must direct itself to just large 
operations, but it does mean that operations in 
that area may be more economically justifiable. 
There are also economies of scale. It costs 
just as much to investigate and write up a 
$50,000 investment as it does a $500,000 in-
vestment. I frankly would like to see the 
minimum capital requirement r aised for equity 
companies. I think you are going to find many 
snall SI3ICs in serious trouble, and it is going to 
gat worse before it gets better. 
So, in conclusion, a small equity company has 
several alternatives for growth and elimination 
of operational loss. One is additional capital. 
Another is merger with another SBIC, effectively 
accomplishing the addition of capital. . Another 
is the charging of higher interest rates. This 
means that a minimum equity company, it it cannot 
merge, or raise ad~itional capital, will probably 
have to make sOIOO straight loans or go out of busi-
ness. These are probably a good description of the 
alternatives with l·hich our company, Dynamic Capi-
tal Corp., is faced with today." 
Within a year, Dynamic Capital Corporation became the first 
SBIC to enter bank~ptcy. 
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TABlE 7 
LICENSED SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENI' COMPANIES 26 
COMBrnED STATEMENrS OF INCOME AND EXPENSE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED MARCH 311 1962 
516 
392 CCI!Ipaniea 69 Companies 55 CCI!Ipaniea 
with Statutory with Statutory with St atutory Reporting Capital of less Capital of Capital of more !TIES Com~ies thnn ~32z 1 ooo ~~2zOOO-~lz0001000 than ~11 0001000 
IM::ONE 
st on loans {sec. 305) $ 5,033, 402 28.8 $2,356,442 56.3 $817,535 47.8 $1,859,425 16.1 
st on debt securities (sec. 304) 5,686,586 32·5 650,668 15.5 394,334 23.1 4,641, 584 4o.o 
st en u. s. Govt. obligations 4z121zz6z 2~.6 2811822 6.8 lz2z236 2·3 ~z 686zl77 ~1.8 
tal interest incCI!Ie $14,827,553 84.9 $3,288,962 78.6 $1,371,405 8o.2 $10,187,186 87· 9 
nds and contingent earnings 209,063 1.2 138,776 3-3 22,475 1.3 47,812 . 4 
management, counseling, etc.) 1,266,531 7·2 403,217 9.6 233,025 13·7 630,289 5.4 inC Cilia 1116z1464 6.1 3241163 8.z 82,486 4.8 7281812 6.~ 
tal fees, other incCI!Ie 1 dividends, etc. 2,641,¢58 15.1 896,156 21.4 337,986 19.8 1,406,916 12.1 
tal IncCI!Ie ~111 488 1 611 100.0 $411851118 100.0 $lz109z321 100.0 ~11zz24zl02 100.0 
EXPENSE 
.ment fees on obligations to BBA 167,549 1.0 157,797 3.8 7,758 .4 1,994 
to others 
st on obligations to SBA 1,595,926 9·1 1,045,652 25.0 315,550 18.4 234,724 2. 0 
st on obligations to other 18o,436 1.0 73,483 1.8 43,871 2.6 63,o82 
·5 financial expenses 4211445 2.8 561137 1.} 121952 .8 4221356 3·7 
tal financial expenses 2z43zaz6 13·2 lz333zo62 31·2 ~01131 22.2 I221lz6 6.2 
ing expenses: 
ries 1 officers 2,630,053 15.0 592,555 14.2 328,000 19.2 1,709,498 14.7 
ries 1 employees 1,373,113 1·9 212,lll 5.1 129,902 7·6 1,031,100 8.9 
rtising and prCI!Iotion . 491,344 2.8 8o,683 1.9 27,381 1.6 383,28o 3-3 
e occupied and office expe~e 1,297,-361 7·4 411,406 9·9 146,478 8.6 739,483 6. 4 
ting and examination costs 1103,299 2.3 177,612 4.2 46, 992 2.7 178,695 1. 5 
1 services 732,274 4.2 202,152 4.8 84,184 4.9 445,938 3.8 
aise.l1 consulting, and engineering 307,822 1.8 sts 113,395 2.7 45,800 ~·1 148,730 J..3 
st.ment advisory and supervisory 
sts 720,822 4.1 97,072 2.} 23,073 1.3 600,677 5·2 
el and communications 852,789 4.9 219,288 5.2 . 91,113 5.3 542,388 4.7 
other 117301613 2·2 435,871 10.4 1631134 2·I 111311608 2·8 
tal operating expenses 101239z599 60.3 215421145 6o.I 11o86105I 63.6 6,911,~97 22·6 
tal expenses 1219741955 74.2 318721214 92.6 114661188 8z.8 Iz633z22~ 6z.8 
t incCI!Ie before provision for losses 
41zl31656 25.8 ~02z90lt. and incCI!Ie taxes : t.4 24~1203 14.2 3z96o,z42 34.2 . 
ted provision for losses 6,456,370 37·0 1,670,468 39·9 593,258 34.7 4,201,644 36.2 
ion for incCI!Ie taxes 1104I1161 6.0 128,431 3·1 6zz201 3·8 8z3z223 1·4 
tal 1z212z53l 43.0 lz1281899 43.0 6z81465 38·2 zz0zzzl61 43.6 
incane (loss) fran ooperations ~2 1 998 1 875 2 {11.22 {1~488z2222 {35.62 {412 1662) ~24.;2) ~11 024 1 618~ ~2-4) 
ed gain (loss) from investments 1,408,688 104,159 117,856 1,186,673 
rovision for incCI!Ie taxes 3211616 661423 4Iz111 2o8zlo6 
t realized gain (loss) frCIII investments lzo81z012 31z106 10zD2 978z261 
tal net inCCI!Ie (loss) (119111863 (114511289) (3441523) : (1161051} 
26Snall &.siness Administration 1 'Office of the Administrator 
l1arch, 1.963 (As cited in SBA and SBIC Amendments, u. s. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 196.3. 
CHAPI'ER VII 
OPERATD!G CHARACTERISTICS OF 
PUBLICLY-OWNED SBICs 
Fran June, 1959, until May, 1962, forty-seven S3ICs 
were successf'ul in marketing issues of their common stock to 
the general public, thereby raising over $300 million for in-
vestment. As of December 31, 1962, the forty-seven publicly-
owned SBICs with $335.6 million in assets, while accounting 
for only 7.4 percent of the 639 companies active in the pro-
gram, represented 61 percent of the total capital of all SBICs. 
Each of the publicly-ot·1Iled SBICs has assets of $1 
million or over and, therefore-, is generally free from the dis-
advantages inherent in the operation of an SBIC ld th assets of 
less than $1 million, which were descrited in the preceding 
chapter. All twenty-nine of the SBICs with assets in excess 
of $3 million . are publicly-owned. They represent total assets 
of $287,006,000, as of December 31, 1962, accounting for 51.8 
percent of the total capital in the program as of that date. 
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TABLE 8 
LARGER SBICs BY CAPITALIZATION 
DECEMBER 31, 1962 
E1e ctronics Capital Corp. 
Boston Capital Corp. 
Business Funds, Inc. 
$32,406 
21,026 
18,960 
18;on 
st. Louis Capital, Inc. 
Southeastern Capital Corp. 
Central Invest. Corp. of 
Denver 
\{ater Indust. Capital Corp. 
Techno-Fund, Inc. 
$ 7,250 
6,422 
SBIC of New York, Inc. 
Midland Capital Corp. 
Gulf-Southwest Capital Corp. 
Capital Southwest Corp. 
Florida Capital Corp. 
16,84]. 
16,$00 
14,950 
10,629 
Business Capital Corp. 
Greater Washington Industrial 
5,900 
5,300 
5,196 
5,017 
Growth Capital, Inc. 
Westland Capital Corp. 
Marine Capital Corp. 
Texas Capital Corp. 
Sierra Capital Corp. 
Franklin Corp. (The) 
Capital for Technical 
10,155 
10,019 
9,961 
9,896 
9,599 
9,594 
Indus.Inc.7,639 
Investments, Inc. 4,874 
Advance Growth Capital Corp. 4,301 
Southwestern Capital Corp. 4,200 
Science Capital Corp. 3,873 
First SBIC of New Jersey 3,696 
Developers SBIC 3,377 
Continental Capital Corp. 3,114 
"The success of the company will greatly depend upon the 
ability of its management to calculate investment risks and poten-
tials." This simple statement contained in the offering prospectus 
of LaSalle street Capital Corporation in March, 1962, clearly points 
out the importance of management capabilities to an SBIC. 
The typical management staff of a publicly-owned SBIC 
covers eight to fifteen people and includes f'ull-time certified 
public accountants, lawyers, investment analysts and management 
counselors. This professional group screens new investments and is 
in a position to provide technical and financial assistance to its 
portfolio companies in varying degrees of skill. Specialization is 
such that Electronics Capital Corporation's fifteen senior execu-
tives, including lawyers and accountants, are all electronically-
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oriented. Boston Capital Corporation carries eight senior offi-
cers with emphasis on technical rather than financial capabilities. 
More often the emphasis is on strength in financial analysis. In 
addition to the SBIC's management group, there are quite often ar-
rangements with outside consultants, usually technical, to provide 
assistant to both the SBIC and its portfolio companies. 
ffiiCs provide advisory and management services to assist 
the firms in v.hich it invests either on a fee basis or as part of 
the costs of the complete financing package Which are negotiated at 
the time of the investment. Most publicly-owned SBICs firmly be-
lieve that the assistance of the SBIC staff is required to provide 
the necessary management skills for the orderly growth of a small 
business concern. There is a thin line between consulting and the 
participation in the management of the snall business concern. The 
latter is forbidden by SBA regulations. The SBIC must refrain from 
providing anything but advice and in no way may exercise control over 
the management of the business. There have been several complaints 
by small business concerns of SBICs pre-empting control as '~11 as 
the expence of consulting fees, but generally the SBIC s have stayed 
within their bounds in this area. 
Soma SBICs have sat up wholly-owned subsidiaries to engage 
in management consulting, although most provide the assistance di-
rectly through the SBIC. An SBIC is parmi tted to provide consulting 
services to other than its portfolio companies as long as the recipient 
meets the eligibility requirements of a small business concern and the 
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services do not constitute a major source of the income of an SBIC. 
A consulting subsidiary must be Wholly-owned by a single SBIC al-
though it may provide services to others. 
SBICs normally except that income from investments and 
consulting services will cover operating expenses. Therefore, the 
maximum size of the staff is determined by the amount of capital. 
This prevents all but the largest SBICs from supplying well-rounded 
management services. The total operating expenses of such an ar-
ganization will run $200,000 and over on an annual basis. Boston 
Capita1 1s total expenses for the year ending March 31, 1%3, amounted 
to $481,713, of lolhich $293,862 represented salaries, consulting ser-
vices, and executive committee and directors 1 fees. All of the 
publicly-owned SBICs, with the exception of those most recently 
formed, with a small percentage of their funds invested, are now 
recording a net profit on operations. 
The nsuru operating proced'Ul'9 for an SBIC, either publicly 
or privately-owned, is for the operating personnel to prevent pro-
posals and racoiiiiJlendations for final action to an executive coiiiillittae 
composed of members of the Board of Directors. In a minimum-sized 
SBIC, the personnel may be virtually identical in each category. How-
aver, in a publicly-owned SBIC, the distinction between operating 
personnel and directors will usually l:e as clear as that in the normal 
industrial · corporate setup. SBICs have been able to attract an im-
pressive group of individuals with wll-established reputations in 
either the financial or technical field to serve as board members. 
This undoubtedly was a factor in the ability of the SBICs to attract 
public funds for investment. 
Income: 
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ILLUsrRATION 1 
BOSI'ON CP.PITAL CORPORATION 
Statement of Income 
and Surplus 
Year Ending March .31, 196.3 
Interest from small business concerns . . . . . . 
Interest from U.S. Government securities (Note B) 
Consulting fees and miscellaneous income 
Total Income . . . . 
Expenses: 
Salaries 
Consulting services (Note C) 
Executive committee and directors' fees 
Custodian, transfer agent and registrar 
Employees' retirement income plan 
Reports to shareholders 
Travel ... . . . 
Legal and accounting services (Note D) 
Miscellaneous 
Income before provision for federal income tax 
Provision for federal income tax (Note E) 
Net income exclusive of gain and loss on investments 
Unallocated retained earnings at March 31, 1962 
Gain or (loss) on investments (Note A): 
$231,514 
35,299 
27,049 
28,683 
31,313 
19,902 
22,540 
21,000 
64,413 
Gain on sale of investment . . . . 268,603 
Provision for estimated loss on sale of investment (600,000) 
Loss on sale of government securities (Note B) ( 15,203) 
Balance charged against reserve for possible loss on investments . 
Retained earnings allocated as reserve for possible loss on invest-
ments at March 31, 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Retained earnings allocated as reserve for possible loss on invest-
ments at March 31, 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
$398,408 
311,082 
95,732 
805,222 
481,713 
323,509 
63,000 
260,509 
57,777 
318,286 
(346,600) 
( 28,314) 
251,800 
$223,486 
B. The corporation has adopted the practice of amortizing premium and discount on U.S. 
Government obligations. As a result, interest income is reduced by $40,000 and loss on 
sale of Government securities is reduced by $13,000. 
C. Of this amount $24,000 was paid to Allied Research & Service Corporation. An officer 
and director of the corporation was also a director and stockholder of Allied. 
D. Includes legal fees of $15,500 paid Sullivan & Worcester, a partner of which is a director 
of the corporation. 
E. The corporation has provided for federal tax on income computed after deductions which 
it believes to be allowable for possible loss on investments (the estimated loss on sale of 
investment is charged for tax purposes against such accumulated allowances), and has 
allocated the entire balance of its retained earnings as a reserve for possible loss on 
investments, although it has not had sufficient investment experience to estimate the 
amount of losses, if any, which may ultimately be realized or be allowable for tax purposes. 
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TABLE 9 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Electronics Capital Corporation 
June 30, 1962 
Charles E. Salik 
Dr. Neil H. Jacoby 
Jerome Kohl berg, Jr. 
Bernard Koteen 
Dr. Joseph M. Pettit 
L. J. Rice, Jr. 
David Salik 
Richard T. Silberman 
President and Director 
Director, Los Angela s, Dean 
Graduate School of Business 
Administration, University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
Director, New York. General 
Partner, Bear, stearns & Co. 
Secretary, Legal Counsel 
Directorl Washington, D. c., 
Partner, Koteen & Burt, Attorneys 
at Law. 
Director, TeChnical Adviser 
stanford, California. Dean of 
Engineering, stanford University. 
Director, San Diego, Director 
and Investment Counselor, First 
Trust and Savings Bank, San 
Diego, California. 
Director, San Antonio, Texas 
President Chairman of the Board, 
Esskay Mfg. Co~ & Westway l1fg. Co. 
Executive Vice President, Treas., 
Director. 
Since twenty-five of the forty-seven publicly-owed SBICs 
have minority bank ownership, it is to 'be expected that meml::ers :· of 
the banking industry are prominent on the Board of Directors of many 
SBICs. Both those affiliated or not affiliated with banking insti-
tutions usually include senior operating management, a legal represen-
tative, and financial and technical specialists. Several SBICs list 
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representatives from the investment banking fraternity ¥mich under-
wrote their connnon stock issue. This includes representatives from 
the top mder,.rri ting firms in the country. 
TABLE 10 
SELECTED UNDERVJRITERS OF SBIC ISSUES 
Name of Underwriter 
Allyn, (A.C.) & Company, Inc. 
Bear, Stearns & Co. 
Blair & Co., Inc. 
Clark, Dodge & Co., Inc. 
Dillion, Read & Co., Inc. 
Harriman, Ripley & Co., Inc. 
Higginson (Lee) Corporation 
Hornblower & Weeks 
Loeb (Carl M. Rhodes & Co.) 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis 
She arson, Hroilmill & Co. 
.§!llQ 
Florida Capital Carp. 
Electronics Capital Corp. 
Science Capital Carp. 
Business Funds, Inc. 
SBIC of New York, Inc. 
Gulf-::Outhwest Capital Corp. 
Sierra Capital Canpany 
St. Louis Capital, Inc. 
SieiTa Capital Company 
Southeastern Capital Corp. 
First SBIC of New Jersey 
Adequacy of eapital is not generally a problem for pub-
licly-owned SBICs at the present time. As of March .31, 196.3, ap-
proximately 40% of the $.3.35.6 million in assets of the public group 
wre still in liquid form and six (Carolinas Capital, Delta Capital 
Corp., Puerto Rico Capital, st. Louis Capital Corp., Wate-r Industries 
Capital Corp., and Westland Capital Carp.) had invested less than 20 
percent of their funds. Two of these--Water Industries Capital Corp. 
and st. Louis Capital. Corp--are in the process of dissolution due to 
their failure to find adequate investment opportunities. Neverthe-
less, several SBICS that have been in the program since 1959, and 1960, 
are now reaching the "loaned up11 stage and are see king additional capital. 
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Theoretically the same three avenues for growth, namely 
sale of stock, borrowing and merger, that are available to privately-
O"tomed SBICs are also available to publicly-owned companies. A pub-
lic issue of conmon stock has not been made since the spring of 1%2, 
¥nth the exception of The First Connecticut SBIC's successful com-
pletion of a $500,000 offering on December, 1962. This was the 
second public offering by the successful term lender. Another SBIC 
offering is not likely to be made in the near future because of the 
present condition of the new issue market in general and the present 
investor feeling toward SBIC common stocks. 
Only ten publicly-o~med SBICs have utilized Section 302 {a) 
debentures to date as part of their capital structure. Virtually all 
of these loans were obtained prior to the SBIC' s public offering of 
common stock. Each of the publicly-owed SBICs is entitled to the 
maximum loan of $400,000 under the 1961 .Amendments to the Law, wich 
m'Ust be applied for prior to October 3, 1963, or within two years of 
the date of licensing, which ever is later. As those SBICs that have 
not considered the use of SBA funds as a leverage factor to be of 
particular advantage to date become fully invested, undoubtedly more 
will make use of Section 302 (a) funds. This is particularly true if 
the proposed amendments to the Law presently before Congress, "to.hich 
would raise the maximum amount of Section .302 (a) debentures that may 
be obtained to $1 million 'With an extension of time is enacted. 
More important to the program in terms of dollars has been 
the use of section 303 (b) operating loans, Which unlike Section .302 
(a) debentures, are senior, secured and of short-term duration. The 
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original Act of Amendments provided for Section .30.3 (b) loans to oo 
granted upon proof of need to the extent of 50 percent of the paid-
in ce.pi tal and surplus, not to exceed ~~4 million. In order to con-
serve its own funds yet make more fund~ available to the program, 
the SBA instituted its 11 bank takeout" plan in 1962. Under the terms 
of the plan, an SBIC executes a S3ction .30.3 (b) loan form to the SBA 
which is assigned to a bank 't-1hich provides the funds with the pro-
vision that the SBA '1-Ti.ll take over the loan with tv.enty-four hours 
notice. The SBA standby plan accounts for the $.3, 000,000 loan made to 
Narragansett Capital Corporation by two banks and the $2,100,000 loan 
made to Advance Growth Capital Corporation by three banks. Section 
.30.3 (b) loans are likely to be the most common method of SBIC expan-
sion for the forseeable future. Amendments to the original legislation 
currently before Congress provide for an increase in the limits of .30.3 
(b) loans to 100 percent of paid-in capital and surplus, not to exceed 
$8 million, under the "bank takeout" program. 
Few SBICs have been able to obtain bank loans, except through 
the SBA standby program, oo cause of the reluctance of commercial banks 
to loan funds secured by venture capital investments. The exceptions 
are Narraganset Capital Corporation's $500,000 line of credit '1-dth a 
Providence, Rhode Island bank, and the $5,000,000 line of credit 'IJ'lich 
Gro'lotth Capital, Inc. has established with Cleveland Trust Company, one 
of its major stockholders. It is likely that loans from sources other 
than the SBA and its standby program will continue to be a minor source 
of funds for SBIC expansion. 
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TABLE 11 
PUBLICLY-OWNED SBICs WITH 
DEBT IN CAP IT ilL STRUCTURE 
12/.31/62 
Section .302(a ) 
DebentureS 
Section .30.3 (b) Total 
loans or bk, loans Capital* 
Advance Grovrth Capital $400,000 $2,100,000 $4,.301,186 
Allied Capital Corp. 1.37,000 400,000 1,525,000 
Capital Investments 400,000 1,.390,514 
Continental Capital 400,000 1,500,000 .3,114,000 
Developers SBIC 400,000 .3,.377,000 
First Conn. SBIC 400,000 2,016,000 
First Mid•rest Capital 400,000 1,4.3.3,000 
Greater Washing Ind. Invest. 1,980,000 
Gro•rth Capital Inc. 5,.350,000 10,155' .348 
illinois Capital Invest. Co. 400,000 
LaSalle street Capital 150,000 
Narragansett Capital Corp. .3,125,000 
Techno Fund, Inc. 2,250,000 
Virginia Capital Corp. 400,000 .300,000 
* Includes Sa cti on .302 (a) debentures 
Mergers are a logical source of new capital for fully-
invested SBICs, in view of the large number of SBICs, both private 
and publicly-o'!..ned, with a snail percentage of their capital in-
vested at the present time. They are extremely difficult to con-
summate, hovrever, end Narragansett Capital Corporation's purchase 
in February, 1962, of the $2.6 million in asoots of Empire SBIC 
remains the only one in "l'lhich a publicly-o1..ned SBIC has been in-
volved to date. In early 196.3, in an unusual proposal, Southws-
tern Capital Corporation discusse d merger with an industrial con-
1,789,000 
2,524,600 
s,ooo,ooo 
cern--Bon Ami Canpany-but the agreement fell through for a numl:er 
of reasons. 
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A final potential course of action for expansion and 
diversification of activities was closed by regulations published 
and effective on February 21, 1963, mich provided that an SBIC 
shall not surrender its licenoo without prior written approval of 
the SBA and such request must be accompanied by a plan of disso-
lution. The action taken by the SBA was the direct result of the 
successful withdrawal of Electro-Science Investors, Inc., one of 
the larger SBICs with assets of ~~15,122,601, on March 31, 1962, from 
the program and their recapitalization as a closed-end investment 
trust. ThJls, SBICs must now expand "rithin the framework of the en-
abling' legislation and amendments or cease to exist. 
The withdrawal of Electro-Science Investors, Inc. dramati-
cally points out the dissatisfaction that several SBICs have ex-
pressed "rith the requirements and restrictions imposed upon opera-
tions by the originating legislation and subsequent amendments. In 
its letter to stockholders 26 concerning the proposed ~r.l.thdrawl, 
management stated its reasons for vdthdrawals as follows: 
"In the opinion of your management, the current 
and long-range interest of the company and its 
shareholders can best be served if the company 
possesses and exercises broad fundamental a.nd in-
vestment powers, Which it could neither possess 
nor exercise as an SBIC. The decision of your 
management to surrender the company's license as 
an SBIC is predictated upon a number of factors: 
(i) experience in operating under the investment 
restrictions impored upon SBIC since the original 
enactment of the statute; (ii) due recognition of 
the fact that legislative developments occurring 
since the licensing of the company have further 
confined the investment opportunities of SBICs; 
and (iii) the oonclusion that the tax advantages 
and ability to borrow from the Government accorded 
26 
Notice of ·~cial Meeting of Slareholders, Electro-Science 
Investors, August 3, 1962, 
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$ICs are negligible in comparison to the 
advantages of operating as a full-scale ven-
ture capital investment company. Consequently, 
your management is of the opinion that the bene-
fits originally contemplated for the company's 
shareholders can now be achieved only if it 
sheds the restrictions inherent in an SBIC and 
henceforth operates as a broader-based invest-
ment company." 
A recent survey27 indicated that the managements of pub-
iicly-owned SBIC viere more dissatisfied l..d.th the restrictions and 
less encouraged by the incentives provided by the SIUC program 
than their privately-owned brethren. Of particular concern were 
the restrictions imposed upon the size of investment, the direct 
acquisition of securities, the definition of a small business and 
the prohibition of foreign investments. The $500,000 limitation 
on single investments is the single most important restriction in 
the eyes of the larger SBICs as their average inves"bnent was wll 
in excess of that level prior to the passing of the amendment and 
its · enaction required significant changes in the major SBIC' s in-
vestment policies. 
A second major complaint of the publicly-owned SBIC con-
earns loss reserves. There are presently no provisions in the lal-r 
to enable SBICs to establish tax-free los.s reserves, in contrast 
to the normal practice of most lending institutions. Thus, losses 
taken on warrants, stock or convertible debentures must be taken in 
the year in which they occur, although straight loans can be written 
27Are SBICs Do¥ Tl:§l~r Jobs, Samuel L. Hayes and Donald H. 
Woods, Harvard Busi:ooss Review, Vol1.m1e 41, No. 2, p. 188. 
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off against bad debt reserves. Ne\or legislation28 now before Cong-
ress which would amend the Internal Revenm Code, would parmi t tax-
deductible reserves against losses up to 20 percent of total invest-
ments. 
It must be remembered that SBICs, in addition to being 
strictly regulated by the SBA, are subject in varying degrees to 
the Securities Act of 19.3.3, the Trust Indenture Act of 19.39, and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. As "inves"bnent companies" by defi-
nition, SBICs are required to register with the S!:C or at least o~ 
tain a clearance from that Government agency. A privately-owed 
SBIC may obtain a clearance from the :950 relatively easily. However, 
all publicly-owned SBICs must go through the costly and cumbersome 
steps of registration. For the smaller public issues of stock by 
SBIC, those of $.300,000 or less, the Commission has adopted a Short. 
form of registration under Regulation E which is quite similar to 
so-called "Regulation A" filing made by industrial firms. Where the 
issue invobres $.300,000 or more, an SBIC is required to make a f'uJ.l 
registration under the Investment Act of 1940, as w:~ll as the Sec-
uri tie s Act of 19.3.3. 
Any SBIC may choore to register with the SEC, however, 
few have done so unless required as the certain tax advantages 
'ltbich are gained through registration as a regulated investment com-
pany are far outweighed by the burdens of dual regulation. Therefore, 
the burdens of dual. regulation generally fall upon the publicly-owned 
28 H.R. 58.3, and S. 297 
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SBICs. Registered SBICs are required to make regular reports 
to the Commission and to their stockholders, at least annually 
as wll as follovdng the Commission's rules regarding rolicita-
tion proxies, consents and authorizations. These regulations 
involve SBICs in vhat they consider needless red tape. More 
important are the restrictions placed upon investment policy by 
the Inves'b:nent Canpany Act. The moat significant of tha se is 
the limitation on the purchase of the voting stock in any one 
company to 20 percent of the total outstanding. Other require-
ments of diversification, distribution of ordinary income and 
source of inccma, are also cumoorsome to SBIC s. In most cases, 
the SBICs must adhere to the strictest of the regulations of tb9 
SBA and the SEC in particular areas. 
Whiel privately-0'\.med SBICs are permitted to issue res-
tricted stock options to treir employees, the me has prohibited 
SBICs under their jurisdiction from issuing eaeurities for ser-
vices, as the Investment Canpacy Act prohibits such options for 
inve s11nent company personnel. Tb9 publicly-owned SBICs feel that 
the inability to offer stock options is a definite handicap in ob-
taining management personnel. 
Another regulation which has created considerable concern 
among publicly-owned SBICs involves investment bankers who are mem-
bers of the board of directors of an SBIC and whose firm makes a 
market in the SBIC stock. The fEC has ruled that they should be ex-
empted from tb9 requirements of Section 30 (F) of the Inves"f1llent 
Company Act which requires that a direct of an investment firm is 
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required to return: to the investment company any profits real-
ized in trading the company's stock within a six month period. 
Thus Growth Capital, Inc. was placed in a position of having to 
sue one of its directors for profits realized mila his invest-
mant banking firm was making a market in the SBIC 1 s common stock. 
~lhile a settlement was worlad out, which was accepted by Growth 
Capital's Board of Pirectors, a stoCkholder has subsequently 
brought suit, seeking to upset the settlement. 
In summary, the publicly-owned SBICs appear to have a 
definite superiority over the smaller privately-owned campania s ude 
to the advantages, both operating and in investing, which are in-
herent in their size and the available fUnds for investment. Ho~ 
ever, this advantage is soneW.at diminished by the requirements of 
dual regulation v.rl th both the SBA and the ~C involving cumbersome 
red tape and certain restrictions on both operations and invest-
ment policy. 
CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET PRICE PERFORMANCE 
OF SBIC COI•lMON STOCKS 
The ability of SBICs to sell their common stock pub-
licly between June 1959 and May 1962, was cited in Chapter III as 
one of the major factors in the expansion of the SBIC program. Since 
the initial public offerings, SBIC stocks have been among the more 
volatile of stock groups. An analysis of the factors influencing 
the market price action, which itself has been highly significant to 
the program, will assist in the attempt to forecast future price 
trends. 
Until the fall of 1960, SBIC common stock received little 
attention from the investment community. While the few SBICs that 
sold stock publicly during this period generally rose to a small 
premium over their offering prices, they did not participate in the 
boom in new issues which was prevailing during the period when im-
mediate premiums of 100% were not uncommon. Time was needed to 
educate the investment community and the general public as to the 
operations and potentials of SBICs. 
Beginning late in 196o, as more SBICs became publicly-owned, 
the industry began to receive favoreble attention. A number of fac-
tors were responsible. First, the 196o Amendments had clarified the 
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originating legislation and permitted SBICs to operate and invest 
under less restrictive regulations. More important was the well-
publicized realization of profits by a few SBICs through the public 
underwritings of small business concerns in their portfolios. This 
factor in the era of emphasis on "glamour" stocks and industries, in 
which SBICs were investing ~t the earliest stages of their develop-
ment, led to the belief in certain quarters that SBICs were a "get-
rich-quick" operation. Brokers were now well aware of the advantages 
of SBICs, particularly the tax incentives, and emphasized them in 
their market letters. SBICs thus became generally identified them-
selves as "glamour" stocks and were caught in the whirlwind upward 
spiral of prices that was typical of the general bull market and par-
ticularly the highly successful new issue market of the time. 
The result was that SBIC prices as a group more than doubled 
between November, 1960, and May, 1961. Individual gains were even 
more spectacular. Electronics Capital Corporation issued at $10 per 
share in June, 1959, moved to a high of $69 in 1961. Electro-Science 
Investors hit-$16! after being issued at $3.60 in September, 1960. 
Greater Washington Industrial Investments rose from $10 to $28, Techno 
Fund from $12i tO $25t, and Venture Capital Corp. from $7.50 to 
$22 J/8. Gains in the area of 50% to 75% from initial offering prices 
were quite common. 
Despite the fact that SBIC market prices reached their 
highs in that month, there was already concern that prices were at a 
vulnerable level in May, 1961. Indeed, prices fell sharply in June 
through September of that year, rallied somewhat in October, then 
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declined steadily through the May, 1962 market break, and have 
dropped moderately since that time. 
Oversaturation of the market is generally believed to be 
one of the reasons for the market decline in SBIC shares. Fort,y-
seven SBICs raised funds through public underwritings over a three 
year period and sixteen more issues were in registration, subse~ 
quently either postponed or cancelled, at _the time of the market 
crash in May, 1962. In addition, the reporting of individual losses 
and write offs by SBICs on certain of their investments, the with-
dra'ilB.l · of ElectrO-Science Investors from the program, which empha-
sized the publicly-owned SBIC 1 s problems operating within the 
regulations of the SBA and the SEC, the collapse of the new issue 
market, the general market decline, bad publicity, mismanagement, and 
tax-loss selling were also significant factors. There is no question, 
however, regardless of the reasons cited, that SBICs were selling at 
falsely inflated values in early 1961, and that a substantial decline 
would be forthcoming at some point in the future. 
It is interesting to note that in their short history SBIC 
common stock prices have not moved in line with the general market. 
Their price movements have been more consistent with those of elec-
tronics, science and other "glamourn groups with which they have 
become closely identified. The discrepancy between the venture 
capital market and the general stock market is rather pronounced, 
and SBIC prices are not likely to closely follow general market trends 
in the future. · 
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CHART 2 
SBIC STOCK PRICES VS THE GENERAL MARKET 
______ _, _____ ,-..... ..._...---
SBIC STOCK PRICES 
vs. 
THE GENERAL MARKET 
12/31/60 TO 3/31/63 
1'2/JI/ 60 siOO 
DOW-JONES 
INDUSTRIAl .AVERAGE 
__ ..,. 
--
" _..,. __ 
~­,_.,.,, ..... _~ 
•CO ... PIIff.\ a • " '- ~ ·• ·., a '"'f~ l ~ B ~ ~ Gt. ll"' C.O : R(PJt( 5l ""' l't 
.\ ( RAG( ' l f , t_ ;.", .,. , ~'l..fh I I f ~ -aUt .) · 'i !.U (S 
60 L..--.L-.....L-...L..J. I I 
1961 
I I 
Source: Arthur Wiesenberger & Company 
CHART 3 
SAMON SCIENCE STOCK AVERAGE VS 
THE OOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE 
SAMSON SCIENCE STOCK AVERAGES 
Averages plotted as of the end of each month and extended 
to the 15th of the current month. For monthly reference 
dat~ refer top. 16 cit Samson Trends, April 30, 1963. 
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In attempting to appraise the rela. ti ve significance of the various 
factors responsible for the price action of SBIC stocks, one imme-
diately encounters the importance of the new issue market. It must 
be emphasized that the coinciding of the strongest new issue market 
in recent financial history and the peak of formations of SBICs was 
a major factor in the expansion of the SBIC program. The strength 
of the new issue market in early 1961 is pointed out by a compila-
tion by Barron's. 29 During the first quarter of 1961, two hundred 
new issues were floated. As of May 15, 1961, 90% were selling above 
their offering price and 50% had risen 100% or more in price. The 
fact that the common stocks of several SBICs rose immediate premiums 
after offering is indicated by the excess of the period. tnvestors 
were readily willing to pay a premium over book value, which repre-
sented only cash and Government bonds, for the stocks of companies 
under unproven management making venture capital investments under 
a new Government program. 
A successful new issue market also meant that SBICs could 
easily bring along their most successful investments to a public 
offering at handsome prices, thereby establishing substantial capi-
tal gains on their portfolios. This was an important factor behind 
the thinking that SBICs were a "quick road to riches." 
The collapse of the new issue market hit SBICs hard. 
Actually, the new issue market began to show signs of weakness in 
the early months of 1962, with the May crash being the climax of the 
~JAnna Merjos, "Speculative Favorites," Barron's, Volume XLI, 
No. 20, May 15, 1961. 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
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TABLE 1~ 
CORPORATE FINANCING 30 
NEW ISSUES OF COMMON STOCK 
(Millions) 
$2,185 
2,301 
2,516 
1,334 
1963 Jan. $71 
Feb. 77 
March 74 
Apr. 191 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
$2,027 
1,664 
3,273 
1,318 
trend. The unavailability of public funds for expansion has forced 
SBICs to look to other areas for capital. In addition, the illiquid-
i ty of venture capital investments pointed out by the inability of 
SBICs to successfully market their investments. Thus a few situa-
tiona that were already ready for public consumption, such as Frank-
lin Corporation's Sperti Products which was in registration, have 
had to be postponed. 
TABLE 13 
ISSUES IN REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC 31 
Week Ended 
9/6/61 
12/27/61 
3/29/62 
5/2/62 
9/6/62 
12/27/62 
3/29/63 
5/2/63 
Pend1ni 
597 
754 
922 
787 
571 
399 
404 
364 
3~ederal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 7, July 1963, 
Page 985. 
31Investment Dealers Digest, June, 1963 
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While the collapse of the new issue market was a major 
factor in the price decline of SBIC common stocks, its effects are 
not all entirely negative to the industr,y. In fact, there are some 
highly favorable long-term implications. No longer are SBICs forced 
to pay inflated prices for the securities of unproven companies in 
competition with themselves and the new issue market itself. The de-
flation of the "glamour" stocks, particularly the electronics industry, 
with which SBICs have been closely identified, has led to valuable 
portfolio diversification with greater attention to more prosaic in-
dustries and special situations. SBICs, particularly those with 
ls.rge cash reserves, are now in a position to invest in small busi-
ness concerns with heal tcy earnings records, a.t realistic prices, as 
the companies have been forced to turn to SBICs for funds, already 
committed for expansion purposes, which were expected to be obtained 
through public offerings. Therefore, the quality of the investments 
made by SBICs over the past year is believed to be definitely super-
ior to that of the preceding years. The new issue market is cur-
rently showing signs of recovery. In recent months selected quality 
issues, such as A. H. Robbins Co., Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Com-
pany and C. R. Bard, Inc., have moved quickly upward in the after-mar-
ket from their offering prices, and have maintained the premiums. It 
is not likely to be too long before a public offering of a SBIC is 
feasible once again. 
- 76-
The prices of SBIC common stocks have quite rightly 
been influenced by the changing values of their portfolio com-
panies. However, over-publicity of gains and losses has been a 
contributing factor to the wide price swings in SBIC stocks. As 
cited earlier, the single investments of Electronics Capital Cor-
poration (ECC) in Potter Instruments Co. and Greater Washington 
Industrial Investments in CEIR, Inc. were important both to the 
expansion of the program and the rise in SBIC stock prices to their 
1961 highs. Through the successful public offering and subsequent 
market rise in price, ECC 1 s $750,000 investment in Potter Instru-
ments rose to a market value high of $10 million eighteen months 
after the initial investment. Similarly, Greater Washington's 
$900,000 investment in CEIR Inc. at the market high for the stock 
was worth $9.8 million. The latter stock has subsequently declined 
from the high of $87 per share to a recent price of $3 3/4. 
Conversely, the later widely-publicized losses through 
write-downs or bankruptcy of small business concern investments 
was instrumental in the price decline experienced by SBICs since 
May, 1961. NarragansettCapital's estimated total loss on its $1.1 
million investment in Bevis Shell Homes through bankruptcy is per-
haps the best known single adverse investment realized by an SBIC. 
Other important realized losses are Flqrida Capital's $550,000 loss 
in J.c.s. Electric Company, Techno Fund's write-down of $700,000 in 
two situations, Boston Capital's sale of its interest in Mastercolor, 
Inc. at a $650,000 loss, and Venture Capital's write-down of its 
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over-all asset value of 20 percent in two loss situations. Few 
of the larger SBICs have escaped without one major realized loss. 
Estimates concerning the total amount already written-off by all 
SBICs vary between $15 and $25 million. 
As most SBICs value their investments at cost, until a 
market price is established or serious problems dictate a write-
down in value, book values are primarily influenced by the move-
ments in price of the publicly-traded small business concerns in 
the SBIC portfolios. There are approximately fifty investments 
made by publicly-owned SBICs with established market values. These 
stocks, most of which are in science or other "glamour" areas with 
thinly traded markets, were hard hit by the market crash in 1962. 
A study32 by s. M. Rubel & Associates indicated that the then 52 
publicly held companies in which SBICs held investments declined an 
average of 59 percent from March 31, 1962, through June 31, 1962. 
Over-all declines from the high to the recent lows in many cases 
exceeded 75 percent in value. Few have made significant recover-
ies in price in line with the action of the over-the-counter-market 
in general. 
It must be remembered that the SBIC program is inherently 
political. As such, it is heavily dependent upon Congressional 
Amendments to the originating law and interpretation of the legis-
lation and regulations by the SBA. It was not until the passage 
of the 196o Amendments that the program really got off the ground. 
32 S. M. Rubel & Associates, SBIC Evaluation Service, 
~uly, 1962. 
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Later changes in the Law, particularly the $500,000 limitation, 
are considered to be major stumbling blocks by the publicly-owned 
SBICs and led to the withdrawal of Electro Science Investors from 
the program. This, undoubtedly, was a significant factor in the 
decline in SBIC stock prices. 
It is the writer's belief that the developments in the 
new issue market, the results of individual investments and legis-
latiwe changes are the three most significant influencing factors 
on the price history of SBIC common stocks to date. 
Limited marketability has been a f actor in the volatile 
price swings of SBIC stocks. Electronics Capital Corporation's 
17,250 shareholders holding the outstanding 2,449,852 shares rep-
resents the largest capital base and widest distribution of stock 
among SBICs. Only Venture Capital Corporation and Florida Capital 
Corporation (American Stock Exchange) and Business Capital Corpo-
ration (Midwest Exchange) are listed with the remainder trading in 
the over-the-counter-market. It would be to the investor's best 
interest to list SBIC shares on a major exchange, particularly the 
New York Stock Exchange, for improved marketability and more orderly 
markets. Few, however, can qualify under Section Bl22 of the New 
York Stock Exchange rules which require operation for at least three 
years, assets of $16 million, and that the SBIC be "substantially 
invested". Several who qualify in size have indicated an interest 
when the time requirement is fulfilled. 
It was originally anticipated that SBIC shares would be 
primarily attractive to investors in high income tax brackets due 
..,.. 
... 
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TABLE 14 
IviARKET PRICES OF STOCK OF SELECTED PUBLICLY-TRADED SHALL 
BUSINESS CONCERN lli"\TES'Jl'IENTS OF SBICS 
BOSTON CAPITAL CORP. 
Electronics Research Associates 
Research Specialties 
Varo, Inc . 
BUSINESS FUNDS, INC. 
All vac Metals 
ELECTRO-SCIENCE INVESTORS, me. 
Communications Industries 
General Electronic Controls 
Tamar Electronics 
Ultrasonic Industries 
ELECTHONICS CAPITAL CORP. 
Potter Instruments 
Transistor Specialties 
FLORIDA CAPITAL CORP. 
Automatic Merchandising 
Roberts Company 
Scherr-Tumico 
Transvision Electronics 
1HE FRAWCLIN CORP. 
Astrex, Inc. 
Systems, Inc. 
IndustrieJ. Plywood 
GRO\~JTH CAPITAL, INC. 
Gilmore Industries 
GULF SOUTH\;JEST CORP . 
Narda Mi cro·Have 
MIDLAND CAPITAL CORP. 
American Precision Industries 
BUSINE SS CAPITAL CORP . 
Va.n Dusen Aircraft Supplies 
Bm.rey 1 s 
GJiEATER \{ASH . INDUSTRIAL INV., TI\JC. 
C. E. I. R, 
.§OUTHEASI'ERN CAPITAl, CORP. 
National Cleveland 
FI~T COl~CTICUT S,B. I . C. 
Specialty Converters, Inc. 
MID-STA'£11S f SJNESS CAPITAl. CORP. 
---Henry s rive-In 
Price Range 
1961 - 1962 
28 3/4 - 9 
20 5/8 - ~- 3/4 
24 - 10 3/4 
11 1/L~ - 5 
14 1/2 - 1 
4 3/4 - 3/8 
22 1/2 - 9 
6 1/L~ - 1 
15 3/4 - 5 1/ 4 
20 - 3 3/4 
6 3/4 
7 1/2 
4 
6 
- 2 3/4 
- 2 3/4 
- 2 
- 2 
16 1/2 - 6 7/8 
15 - 21/2 
7 3/8 - 4 1/8 
20 
- 7 
9 3/L, - 2 1/4 
15 1/4 - 6 
16 - 5 3/4 
10 - 5 3/4 
87 - 6 1/2 
L, 1/2 - 1 
14 - 7 1/2 
19 - 7 1/2 
Price Range 
1963 
/+ 5/8 - 7 1/8 
13 - 8 
6 7/8 - 4 
5 1/2 - 5 
2 3/8 - 1 1/10 
1/2 - 1/4 
9 - 8 1/L, 
1 1/8 - 3jL,. 
8 1/2 - 6 3/L~ 
6 1/2 - 4 3/8 
2 5/8 - 1 3/4 
5 - 3 1/4 
2 - 1 3/L, 
1 5/8 - 1 3/8 
6 1/4. - 8 
2 1/8 - 1 5/8 
6 3/4 - 5 1/4 
6 1/2 - 6 
2 1/2 - 1 7/8 
5 - 3 
4 J/4 - 3 3/8 
6 1/1+ - 5 1/4 
6 3/8 - 3 3/1+ 
1 7/8 - 1 1/4 
2 1/8 - 1 1/2 
7 5/8 - 5 5/8 
Price 
June 30, 1963 
5 7/8 
8 
~ 
5 
1 1/8 
5/16 
8 1/L} 
3jl+ 
6 3/4 
4 3/8 
2 5/8 
4 3/8 
2 
1 3/8 
6 3/4 
1 5/8 
5 1/4 
6 1/2 
1 7/8 
L1. 1/8 
4 1/L, 
5 1/2 
3 3/L, 
1 1/~e• 
2 1/8 
5 5/8 
~ 
I 
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TABLE 15 
PRICE HISTORY OF SBIC CONHON STOCKS 
Dates of 
Initial Pub- Issue All-time Price 
SBIC lie Offering Price high 6/._J_0/._62_ 
Advance Growth Capital 8/61 $10 tlO $ 4 
Allied Capital Corp. ~/(:f) 11 "l l 3/4 5 3/4 
Anderson N e1>r England Capital 10/61 15 15 6 1.4 
Boston Capital Corp. 9/EIJ 15 29 3/S 7 3/4 
Business Capital Corp. 2/61 10 16 6 5/8 
Business Funds, Inc. 8/61 11 11 1/2 6 1/8 
California Growth Capital 10/61 12 1/2 12 1/2 5 1/S 
Capital Investments 9/EIJ 5 1/2 20 1/2 6 1/2 
Capital Southwest Corp. 7/61 11 11 1/2 5 1/2 
Capital for Technical Ind. 6/61 10 15 1/2 6 3/4 
Carolinas Capital 5/62 10 10 5 3/4 
Central Inves tment Corp. 8/61 3 3/4 4 1 l/2 Citizens & Southern Capital 3/61 5 l/2 8 1/2 3 7/8 
Continental Capital 6/EIJ 14 16 1/4 8 7/8 
Delta Capital Corp. 2/62 11 11 5 1/2 
Developers SBIC 3/62 5 5 3 1/8 
Electronics Capital Corp. 6/59 10 69 7• 3/4 
First Connecticut SBIC 10/EIJ 10 15 7 3/4 
First Midwest Capital 5/6o 7 1/2 11 1/2 5 1/2 
First SBIC of New Jersey 7/61 12 1/2 13 3/8 6 1/2 
Florida Capital Corp. 6/EIJ 8 15 1/8 3 3/4 
Franklin Corp. 6/6o 10 25 7 1/2 
Greater Washington Ind. Inv. 4/6o 10 28 1/2 3 7/8 
Grm·rth Capital Inc. 6/EIJ 20 34 10 1/2 
Gulf Southwest Capital Corp. S/61 12 12 5 3/8 
Illinois Capital Invest. Co. 1/62 10 10 4 1/8 
La Salle Street Capital 4/62 9 9 5 1/2 
Marine Capital Corp. 4/61 15 20 5/8 8 1/4 
Midland Capital Corp. 2/61 12 1/2 22 1/4 7 1/2 
Mid-States Business Capital 11/60 11 17 7/8 6 1/4 
Minnesota. Capital Corp. 6/61 1.15 1 3/4 3/8 
Monmouth Capital Corp . 11/61 10 11 1/8 5 1/4 
Narragansett Capital Corp. 9/60 11 21 4 
Puerto Rico Capital 4/62 10 10 3 7/8 
St. Louis Capital Corp. 6/61 lO 10 l/2 6 l/4 
Science Capital Corp. 7/61 8 8 3/8 4 l/4 Sierra Capital Corp. l/62 10 10 5 
S.B.I.C. of N. Y. ll/61 20 22 1/2 10 3/8 Southeastern Capital Corp. 'i/61 12 l/2 13 112 5 30 Southwestern Capital Corp. 6/61 3 3 3 8 l l 2 
Techno Fund, I nc., il~ 12 1/2 25 1/2 3 Texas Capital Corp . 6 11 3/.4 4 1/4 
Venture Capital Corp. 9/60 7 1/2 22 3/8 3 3/4 
Virginia Capital Corp. 10/.60 10 1/2 16 6 
Westland Capital Corp . 1/62 11 11 6 7/8 
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to the provision for deduction of losses on SBIC common stocks 
against ordinary income. However, the boom that developed in 
SBIC stocks appears to have attracted as stockholders those smaller 
investors that were buying "glamour" stocks and widely partici-
pating in the new issue market. The average shareholding in SBIC 
stocks is not high. 
TABLE 16 
AVERAGE DOLLAR INVESTMENT PER SBic33 
Registered 
Shares Stock- 5/31/62 Average 
Com;eany Outstanding holders As e,f Price Invest. 
Boston Capital 1,525,000 9,974 11/30/62 8 1/8 $1,243 
Business Funds 1,833,515 3,462 11/26/62 5 7/8 3,114 
Capital Southwest 1,495,000 4,795 2/17/63 5 3/4 1,794 
Cap. for Tech. Inc. 857,600 5,100E 1/18/63 5 7/8 987 
Electronics Corp. 2,449,852 17,250 2/26/63 9 1/8 1,296 
Franklin Corp. 1,071,000 7,000E 3/10/63 7 7/8 1,205 
Growth Capital 538,150 4,528 2/15/63 12 1/4 1,458 
Marine Capital 730,525 4,793 12/31/62 9 1/8 1,387 
Midland Capital 1,453,846 7.,.781 6./11/63 7 1/4 1,356 
Narragansett Cap. 791,600 2,136 12/3x62 4 3/8 1,623 
Sierra Capital 985,380 2,828 3/5 63 5 3/8 1,871 
Techno Fund 464,796 3,350 6/1/62 4 1/8 573 
AVERAGE $1,492 
For that reason, year-end tax loss selling has not been 
as evident as anticipated. SBIC stocks as a group have actually 
advanced in the October-December period in 1960, 1961 and 1962. 
Nevertheless, tax loss selling was undoubtedly a factor in the 
33Halle & Steigli tz, Small Business Investment Companies, 
March, 1963. 
Value 
- 82-
sharp market drop in SBIC share prices from May, 1961, to date. 
Investors would naturally prefer to take losses on SBIC stock rather 
than on other common stocks, all other factors being equal, to ob-
tain ordinary income tax loss treatment. There is also the incen-
tive for stockholders to selL their SBIC investments at a loss to 
obtain the ordinary loss deduction, and buy back after a thirty day 
wait, rather than continue to hold an SBIC stock with a paper loss. 
Earnings from operations are not considered to be import-
ant to the price action of SBIC common stocks • . As venture capital 
organizations, investors look to SBIC stocks as capital gains vehi-
cles rather than income producers from current earnings. All but 
two (Anderson New England Capital and Puerto Rico Capital), both with 
a small percentage of their capital invested, of the publicly-owned 
SBICs recorded an operating profit in the quarter ended March 31, 1963. 
All but nine SBICs have refrained from paying cash divi-
dends to their stockholders to date, preferring to converse the capi-
tal for reinvestment and provision for possible future losses on in-
vestments. Only First Connecticut SBIC, a term lender, has paid cash 
dividends on a regular basis. The other SBICs that have paid cash 
dividends have elected to qualify as a regulated investment company 
and thereby avoid corporate taxation. 
In liew of paying to its stockholders a cash dividend, 
in October, 1962, ECC distributed a portion of its holding of Potter 
Instruments common stock on the basis of one share of Potter for each 
ten shares held of ECC. Value of the distribution was $.675 per share 
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of ECC, 80 percent of which was non-taxable as a return of capi-
tal. The policy of distributing portfolio securites to the stock-
holders by SBICs has been followed by others, most recently a partial 
distribution of the shares of Parkview Drugs by Mid-States Business 
Capital, and is likely to be quite common in the future. Distribu-
tion of securities directly affects the book value and the market 
value of an SBIC. With the exception of dividends paid in this form, 
the dividend payments of an SBIC are not considered to have signifi-
cant bearing on its price trend. 
A final factor which had influenced SBIC prices has been 
the treatment which the industry has received from the financial 
press. With the exception of the wide publicit.y given to the profits 
realized on individual investments such as Potter Instrument prior 
to the middle of 1961, which undoubtedly was a factor in the upward 
spiral of prices, the publicit.y has generally been unfavorable. As 
early as October, 1961, Barron's was sharply critical of the entire 
program in a lead editorial entitled "Businessman's Risk? - SBA and 
SBICs Need A Sweeping Reappraisal." Throughout; most of 1962, num-
erous articles such as "Shaky SBICs" in the Wall Street Journal of 
July, 1962, clearly pointed out the problems of the industry. As re-
cently as July, 1963, with SBIC prices at their lowest historical level 
a lengthy articleJ4 in the Wall Street Journal criticized what it con-
sidered to be conflict of interest investments and Business Week's F~ 
nance Section contained an article entitled "SBICs: Roc~Road Looms 
Ahead." 
34 
pp. 1 & 16. 
"Double Standard", The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1963, 
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Individual SBIC common stocks have generally moved in 
price quite closely together as a group. This is usually true of 
stocks of companies in new industries or companies in an industry 
which is "discovered" by investors and which subsequently rise rap-
idly in price and are then deflated. 
TABLE 17 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SELECTED SBIC MARKET PRICES 
SBICs with Public Offerings Year Year 12/31/62 
Prior to l/lL61 1961 1962 6/30/63 
Boston Capital Corp. 37% -50% 
-l5% 
Electronics Capital Corp. 45 -66 -27 
Florida Capital Corp. 72 -58 3 
The Franklin Corp. 103 -57 
- 6 
Greater Wash. Ind. Invest. Inc. 93 -73 -22 
Narragansett Capital Corp. 52 -67 
-9 
Venture Capital Corp. 105 -66 
-9 
SBICs with Public Offerings 
7/l/61-l/3/62 
Advance Growth Capital 
-44% -20% 
Business Funds, Inc. 
-35 - 6 
Capital Southwest Corp. -36 
- 6 
Gulf Southwest Capital Corp. 
-35 -12 
SBIC of New York -35 -23 
Science Capital -38 10 
Sierra Capital 
-41 -15 
Despite the fact that SBIC stocks as a group reached 
a historical low in June, 1963, certain prices have been moving up-
ward since the first of the yea:r. These companies are SBICs which 
have been buying their own stock in the open market. Since all but 
one (Capital Investments) were selling at substantl:ll discounts from 
book value per share as of June 30, 1963, purchases have been made 
either to increase book value by reduction of the number of shares 
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outstanding at a lower price than present asset value. Sierra 
Capital Corporation, Business Funds, Inc. and Puerto Rico Capi-
tal have followed this course of action. More important have been 
purchases by SBICs in the attempt to prevent insurgent stockholder 
groups from taking control with the ambition of liquidating the 
SBIC at a profit. Florida Capital Corporation, Capital Southwest 
Corporation, Advance Capital Corporation and St. Louis Capital. 
have been subject to fights for control this year with favorable 
benefits to the SBICs market prices. Water Industries Capital Cor-
poration was liquidated the year at a value in excess of previous 
market levels. 
After going through periods of both unanimous enthusi-
asm and subsequently completely prevailing pessimism in their history, 
SBIC stocks are now the subject of divided opinion within the invest-
ment community. Thinking ranges from the idea that the industry is 
doomed to the strengthening feeling that at their present levels se-
lected SBIC common stocks are attractive as longe~term investments. 
The prevailing opinion, however, remains generally pessimistic as 
reflected by the historical low current market prices. 
U.t..I.)."""!J..lU.l..l.'-'U - .... UJ...J.l..J.lV.l..lJ. '"r--l£..1....tlJ ODl\..tt:i ·~ ._ 
TABLE l8 
Market Percentage 
Price Portfolio Gain 
to Funds Invested Capital Gains 
To9 
Book11 
Book Value !;_a_rnihgs .. and Losses 
Change AveraoCe 3/31L62 6L3o71i3 Per S are Per Share Total To 
6/30/63 From Value 0/o of "/o of 12Mos. M~t In vest· Total 61 0 
# or12 nge Price 5/31 Per For Each Capital #of Capital Ended Divi- Unrea· Wrne Rea· ment funds 
~ Bid Ask Bid Share ComEany Inv. Invested Inv. Invested 3/31/63 dends lized Downs lized Cost In vest ed 
3 3/4 $ 4 . 4 1/4 + 1/8 9.25 43 6 40"/o 15 161"/o $ . 0120 $.27 . 16"/o 2"/o 
4 3/4 5 3/4- 6 1/2 + 1/4 10. 35 56 19 128 19 157 . 25 . $ . 16 . . 
~ 1/4 6 1. 4· 7 . 1/2 13. 30 50 . . 4 46 {. 10) . . . -
1/2 7 3/4~ 8 . 3/8 13.24 58 22 43 27 58 . 21 (. 26) ( . 40) . 16 . -
7/8 6 5/8 +1 1/2 9. 25 72 8 77 12 110 . 32 . 29 (. 16) 5 1 
1/2 6 1/8- 6 3/8 . 1/8 10.30 59 9 15 29 58 . 29 (. 10) - . . 
3/4 5 1/8- 5 1/2 - 9. 44 55 3 22 8 86 . 17 . (1. 63) . 16 . . 
1/2 6 1/2- 7 - 6,01 108 9 100 12 123 . 26 . 453 . 33 . 92 10 4 
1/2 5 1/2- 5 3/4 ·1 1/8 9.96 55 6 16 20 49 . 14 - . . . 
1/4 6 3/4- 7 . 7/8 8.91 76 7 21 10 44 . 06 - - - . 
3/4 5 3/4- 6 1/4 - 8.81 65 . . 6 25 .03 - - . -
1/2 1 1/2- 1 5/8 . 3.38 44 ,13 23 20 51 . 08 . - . -
~ 1/2 3 7/8- 4 1/8 s. 00 77 18 44 18 44 .03 - - . . 
7 3/4 8 7/8· 9 1/8 -1 1/2 15. 53 57 17 89 31 150 .35 2.46 . 10 67 13 
5 1/2 5 1/2- 5 7/8 . 1/4 9.80 56 - - 2 17 - - - - -
2 5/8 3 1/8- 3 3/8 + 1/8 4.51 70 - - 17 72 . 1620 . 10 . - -
7 3/4 7 3/4- 8 1/4 . 3/4 14.39 54 2 1 45 21 60 . 0916 . 83 { . 21) . 6115 174 10 
7 1/4 7 3/4- 8 1/8 . 3/8 7.78 99 80 95 80 118 
. 7920 .44 . - - -
4 5/8 5 1/2- 6 - 7. 12 77 16 150 16 150 • 06 1. 39 - 120 13 
6 6 1/2- 7 . 1/8 11. 26 57 10 32 18 123 . 57 . - - -
3 3/4 3 3/4 - 6. 82 55 33 93 31 85 . 13 . 25 - { . 25) {. 27) - -
6 7/8 7 1/2- 7 3/4 5/8 9. 31 85 21 76 23 97 . 34 . 36 ( . 06) 12 4 
3 7/8 3 7/8- 4 1/8 - 7. 04 57 21 86 22 150 .24 1.66 1. 68 (1. 16) ( . 65) -
0 1/2 10 1/2-11 . 1/8 16. 62 63 22 77 23 163 . 51 . 30 ( . 07) (2.42) • 70 
-
. 
5 3/8 5 3/8- 5 5/8 . 1/2 10.79 50 7 14 22 43 . 17 (.OS) - - -
3 7/8 4 1/8- 4 5/8 + 1/4 9. 37 44 4 15 13 142 . 27 .35 - 15 1 
4 1/2 5 1/2- 5 3/4 + 5/8 8.61 61 - - 15 144 . 20 . 89 ( . 34) ,21 75 12 
6 3/4 8 1/4- 8 1/2 + 3/8 13. 33 62 10 24 15 40 . 19 . 20 . 15 ( • 72) - - -
6 7 1/2- 7 3/4 . 1/2 11. 90 63 10 41 29 62 ,35 . 354 . 09 - 20 1 
6 6 1/4- 6 5/8 5/8 11.24 55 5 53 6 60 . 21 2. 30 1. 63 1. 77 70 17 
3/8 3/8- 5/8 - . 91 41 2 30 5 63 . 02 . { . 10) - - -
41/2 5 1/4- 6 + 1/4 8.63 60 - - 5 51 . - - . -
3 3/4 4 - 4 3/8 + 1/8 9. 31 43 15 76 20 125 . 26 . 19 (1. 04) (. 12) - -
41/4 3 7/8 41/8 . 3/8 8.44 45 - - 18 56 (. 23) - - - -
5 3/4 6 1/4- 6 5/8 -1 1/8 8.96 70 1 8 3 12 .11 - (. 12) - . 
3 1/4 4 1/4- 4 1/2 . 7 . 10 60 3 11 9 60 . 07 - - - . 
5 1/2 5 - 5 1/4 - 9. 15 54 6 3 11 21 . 12 (. 02) . OS - -
0 1/2 10 3/8-10 3/4 . 5/8 l!t 00 58 - - 23 34 ,30 - ( . 61) - - -
5 3/8 5 3/4- 6 - 11.23 51 8 18 16 58 . 26 - ( . 35) (. 35) . -
11/4 1 1/2- 1 3/4 . 1/4 2. 71 55 2 26 9 67 . 08 . . . -
~ 7/8 3 - 3 1/4 . 1/8 7.87 39 13 134 13 213 . 09 (. 34) (3. 11) - . 4 1/4- 4 1/2 - 3/8 6,32 67 13 39 23 73 . 27 - ( . 22) . 15 
-
-
~ 5/8 3 3/4 - 3/8 4.41 85 4 41 7 56 . 02 . ( . 40) (1. 44) 
- -
5 6 - 6 1/2 - 9. 05 66 18 190 18 170 .11 - ( . 60) - - -
1/4 6 7/8- 7 1/8 + 1/8 10. 00 67 - - 9 29 . 07 - . -
pital gain realized and$. 25 operating income. 13 Percentage of funds invested is the relationship between total inve stments at cost in 
small businesses divided by total SBIC capital. Thus if an SBIC uses SBA or other 
9/30/61. financing, this percentage could exceed 100%. 
ltiplying average for bid-ask price at month end of publicly 14 Total assets are computed aJ: cost. and do not reflect increases in market value of 
ampnies by number of shares owned or to be owned upon full investments. 
ity ri ghts. lf market price was below cost, market price was 15 ersion had alre-,tly been made. Gains over cost of investment Dividend in Potter Instrument stock. 
number of SBIC shares outstanding. 
16 Six months ended 12/31 /62 - speci a l calcul ation . 
~ capital gain divided by cost of such investment. 17 Nine months ended 12/31 /61. Income from c apital gains on s-dc s of se cnritics 
d c apita l gain divided by cost of all investments in small represented all income. 
18 First quarter earnings. 
Share is adjusted to reflect the unrealized c api t al gaim pe r 20 6 months ended 9/30/62. of each mongh. 
stments made by each SB!C reflects the different com panies in 21 
· Year ended 12/31/62 . . nts have be en m ade and docs not inc lude additional !i!"lancing 
rc type of fin ancing to a >p<!cific company. 
-
CQ. 
0" 
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CHAPTER IX 
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 
It has long been established that a well diversified 
portfolio of high quality common stocks is a satisfactory long-
term investment vehicle. Venture capital common stocks do not 
fall within the definition of high quality common stocks and there-
fore cannot be presumed to be satisfactory investment vehicles. 
In the absence of an operating record o~ more than five 
years in duration for SBICs one must turn to other venture capi-
tal organizations in order to draw conclusions as to the possible 
longer-term experience of SBICs. The most logical choice is Amer-
ican Research and Development Corporation which has a seventeen 
year record of statistical data to draw upon as a guide to the 
future for SBICs. 
The method of operation of American Research and Devel-
opment Corporation (ARD) is quite similar to that of the larger 
publicly-owned SBICs as indicated in the company's 1962 annual 
report: 
"American Research and Development Corporation 
* assists in creating companies based on the ideas 
and new techniques of competent men 
Chelcy C. Bosland, The Common Stock Theory of Investment-
Its Development and Significance, Roland Press, New York, 1937 
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* invests in new companies 
* invests in existing small or medium-sized 
companies which appear to have growth potential 
In addition to supplying capital, ARD makes avail-
able to companies the technical and administrative 
experience of its management, board of directors and 
its many advisers in the United States and abroad. 
There is no single industry or group of industirea 
into which ARD 1 s tunds are directed. Many of the in-
vestments are in technically-based companies, but funds 
also have been invested in such diverse fields as pub-
lishing, equipment leasing, gas gathering, educational 
supplies and equipment, oil exploration, and consult-
ing and data processing services. Investment oppor-
tunities in any field of endeavor which is felt to be 
constructive and to possess exceptional possibilities 
for growth are considered. 
ARD has no specific formula for financing companies. 
Each investment opportunity is considered indivi-
dually, and the form of the financing is dictated by 
the individual requirements of the situation. The 
formulation of any particular investment agreement 
is based on the principle that the greatest ultimate 
success will result from equitable arrangements mu-
tually satisfactory to the client and to ARD. Since 
its major objective is capital appreciation, ARD seeks 
an equity position or the right ultimately to acquire 
an equi~ position in each portfolio company. The 
amount of capital which ARD invests in a single si tua-
tion is flexible and, again, is determined by the 
client's requirements. In general, initial invest-
ments are in the range of $50,000 to $1,000, but situa-
tions requiring capital in excess of $1,000,000 are also 
considered. In some cases, with the client's consent, 
other professional investors participate with ARD in 
the financing of a venture. 
ARD does not seek control in the companies in which 
it invests; however, there are situations where the 
amount of capital required and the degree of risk in-
volved may necessitate that ARD have a controlling 
interest during the company's early years. Even in 
such cases, ARD does not manage companies. ARD seeks 
to invest only in situations and companies where able 
management b,y men of competence and integrity seems 
assured." 
- 89-
Although its operations are quite similar to a larger 
publicly-owned SBIC, it must be stressed that ARD is not an 
SBIC. It is not licensed by the SBA and consequenUy is not 
bound in its investment and operating policies by the limita-
tions and restrictions imposed by that Government agency, nor 
does it receive any of the benefits in the form of income tax 
concessions and the right to borrow SBA funds. In addition, 
ARD generally has not participated in the day to day operations 
of its portfolio companies to the extent of that of the larger 
amply-staffed SBICs. 
Since its formation in 1946, with $3,408,342 in paid 
in capital, through 1962, ARD has invested in 78 companies of 
the approximately 3,500 situations which it seriously considered. 
Capital gains aggregating $4,472,054 have been realized from the 
sale of securities in 30 companies, capital losses of $813,101 
have been realized in 10 situations, and net unrealized apprecia-
tion in the securities of the 44 companies in the protfolio as 
of December 31, 1962, amounted to $10,910,493. In addition, dis-
tributions in cash or in the common stock of High Voltage Engin-
eering Corporation, one of ARD's most successful investments, 
which have been made in each year since 1954, were valued at 
$4,607,025 at date of distribution or at $9,980,591 with the 
value established by the market value of the stock distributed 
as of December 31, 1962. 
The investor who purchased ARD's stock in the initial 
offering of August 8, 1946, has had appreciation of 360 percent in 
-~-
value through June 30, 1963, on the basis of the market value 
of ARD stock and distributed stock of investments as of that 
date and capital gains dividends paid in cash. Over the same 
period, net asset value has approximately tripled. The com-
pound annual rate of growth of value over the seventeen year 
period is 9.4 percent compared with 7.6 percent for the Dow-
Jones Industrial Average. Therefore, historically, the common 
stock of ARD has proven to be a satisfactory long term invest-
ment vehicle. 
This record has been established by a company that 
began operations prior to the technological boom stimulated by 
Government spending in which the great majority of ARD 1 s port-
folio investments have participated. It should be noted that 
there was negligible appreciation in net asset value for nine 
years and it was not until the ninth year of operations that a 
distribution from capital gains was made to stockholders. A cash 
dividend from operating income was not made until 1955 and only 
three additional payments have been made subsequently. 
An analysis of the market's appraisal of ARD 1 s common 
stock offers significant guidelines for the future of SBIC com-
mon stock prices. In each year of its existence, ARD, at its 
low for the year, bas sold at a discount from net asset value 
ranging from 6o percent to 10 percent. It was not until 1951 
that the market price exceeded the net asset value and then by 
a premium of only 10 percent. The common stock did not sell at 
a premium again Until 196o, and the highest premium (80 percent) 
-· ..• ·-- -- -
TABLE 19 
American Research &-Development Corporation 
1946 - 1962 
Year Net Assets Change in Div. Price Times 
Ended Per Security Unrealized Per Price Range Net Asset Valuef 
Dec. 31 Totala Shareb Profitsa Apprec.a Sh.ac Low High Low High 
1946 $ 3.4 $ 8.04 $ - $ nil $ 
1947 3.5 7.83 nil 0.03d 
-
3 7 0.4 0.9 
1948 3.4 8.59 0.002 0.14 - 6 8 0.7 0.9 
1949 4.5 8.52 nil 0.18 - 7 8 0.8 0.9 
1950 5.4 8.68 0.24ld 0.52 - 7 8 0.8 0.9 
1951 7.9 8.78 0.14 0.50 - 6 10 0.7 1.1 
1952 8.6 9.60 0.004 0.69d - 7 10 0.7 1.0 
1953 8.5 9.50 0.005d 0.15 - 5 9 0.6 0.9 
"' 1954 11.0 12.22 0.001 2.44 0.08 6 9 0.5 0.8 1-' 
I 
1955 12.4 13.74 0.37 1.34d 0.417 9 11 0.6 0.7 
1956 10.8 12.22 0.20 1.53 e 8 10 0.7 0.8 
1957 9.8 11.10 0.38 1.29d e 7 10 0.6 0.9 
1958 14.8 16.72 0.009 5.04 e 7 13 0.4 0.7 
1959 23.5 19.80 0.76 4.54 0.43 10 15 0.5 0.8 
1960 38.9 25.33 0.47 7.38 0.46 12 29 0.5 1.1 
1961 37.0 24.14 1.16 2.31~ 0.55 22. 42 0.9 1.8 
1962 30.7 20.01 0.28 5.88 0.61 14 31 0.7 1.6 
Total $3.538 Avg. - '().03 0":99 
a. in millions. 
b. adjusted for 3-for-1 split in 1960. 
c. includes investment income and security profits. 
d. deficit or decline. 
e. 1 share of High Voltage Engineering for each 30 ARDin 1956, 1-for-45 in 1957, 
and 1-for-60 in 1958. 
f. based on book value at December 31. 
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ever paid was reached in the following year. Fluctuations 
in market price have been more pronounced than for most other 
investment ~ehicles, as is the usual case with venture capi-
tal investments. 
Nevertheless, this seventeen year price record, which 
has paralleled the market's interest in venture capital invest-
menta and ARD' s own particular investment results, bas been 
rather orderly as compared with the chaotic price experience of 
SBICs during the past four years which has seen market prices 
ranging from premiums of four and five times book value to the 
presently prevailing 40 percent discounts. While the SBICs 
price record reflects the sharply contrasting periods of in-
vestor enthusiasm and pessimism towards the group, SBICs are 
likely to have a more volatile price performance than ARD due to 
the impact of possible legislative changes in the program, tax 
features and wider publicity of developments. 
Public information of the past record of other venture 
capital groups such as Draper, Gaither and Anderson, Laurence 
Rockefeller and J. H. Whitney & Company, is quite sketchy. How-
ever, such information that is available lends one to believe 
that the record of these sophisticated venture capital specialists 
is quite similar to tba t of ARD. 
The similarity of experience is confirmed in the case 
of Ji. H. Whitney & Company through the data presented by c. Wrede 
Petersmyer, partner of the firm, testifying before the Committee 
of Banking and Currency, U. s. Senate on December 2, 1958. 
Briefing on the Investment Act, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1959, pp. 117-29 
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Mr. Petersmyer testified that during the twelve previous years 
of existence, J. H. Whitney & Co. had made investments in 
slightly more than 50 concerns with growth potential among over 
7,000 applications. The investment program has been success-
ful as measured b,y the quadrupling of the original $10 million 
capital over the twelve year period as determined by manage-
ment~s own evaluation of the securities in the portfolio at that 
time (December, 1958). It was also pointed out that if t~e ori-
ginal capital had been invested in a diversified portfolio of 
listed securities, the capital would have tripled over the 
twelve year period with "far less trouble and far less work". 
It is particularly significant to learn that 250 percent 
of the 300 percent increase in capital was accounted for by five 
ventures. One of the five was an early success which was par-
tially responsible for the ability of the company to make the 
major investments at a later date that accounted for a large pro-
tion of the firm's growth. Each one of the five successful invest-
ments involved an investment of $2 million or more. 
The company had made at the time of testimony 38 in-
vestments involving less than $500,000. In 15 of these, all or 
substantially all of the investment was lost; in 6, a break-even 
was achieved through selling out; in 4, a small profit was real-
ized but at any unfavorable rate of return; and in 13, the finn 
considered its investment to be successfUl. The a verage rate 
of return on the 38 investments over the twelve year period, 
assuming an average risk of six years, was somewhat less than 2 
percent. The rate of return on the 13 successfUl investments 
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was 9 or 10 percent, not enough to cover the overhead of J. 
H. Whitney & Co. This experience has led the company towards 
investing more substantial sums of money in a more limited 
number of enterprises. Whitney found that investments in units 
of $50,000 or less were not practical "because small invest-
menta take as much time as large investments", unless the in-
vestment was made with the knowledge that additional fUnds 
would be required. 
Mr. Petersmyer stated, in particular relevance to the 
proposed legislation establishing SBICs, that there were three 
principal requirements for success in investing in venture capi-
tal situations-an able staff, an adequate capital base, and 
adequate liquid capitaL His testimony was concluded as follows: 
"It would appear to us that the total initial 
capital requirements for such an investment 
firm would be in the area of several million 
dollars rather than in the area of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Too much can be lost too 
quickly, and the cost of an adequate organiza-
tion comes too high." 
From the experience of American Research and Develop-
ment Corporation, J. H. Whitney & Company, and other established 
venture capital organizations, SBICs should have been adequately 
forewarned of the dangers inherent in venture capital investments. 
However, the basic requirements o£ adequate capital and an adequate 
staff to supervise a diversified portfolio of investments were 
generally overlooked in the rush to establish SBICs and "get rich 
quick" through the new venture capital vehicle. A portion of the 
failure to benefit from the experience of established venture 
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capital organizations obviously lies in the program itself, 
which encouraged the formation of SBICs with private capital 
of as little as $150,000. However, the purpose of Congress in 
passing the originating legislation and amendments and the SBA 
in administering the program was to provide additional equity · 
capital and long-term loans for small business firms to assist 
in the development of the nation's economy, not to provide private 
investors with a new source of capital appreciation nor to pro-
tect them from capital loss. 
CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Opinion concerning the future of the SBIC program 
has ranged from President Kennedy's statement of his belief 
that it has great potential as a Fourth Banking System, to 
fill the long-term and equity capital needs of small business 
to predictions that the entire program would soon completely 
disappear from the financial scene. Such wide division of 
opinion is characteristic of the division of thinking that 
has prevailed on various aspects of the program since its in-
ception with the passage of the Small Business Investment Com-
pany Act of 1958. 
Following the passage of the originating legislation, 
the SBIC program started slowly as might be expected of a pro-
gram involving a new financial concept. However, the pace of 
the expansion of the program accelerated after the passage of 
the l96o Amendments, which permitted more effective operating 
and investment techniques. More important to expansion was the 
public reception to SBIC common stock offerings in the midst of 
an enthusiastic new issue market and identification with the 
glamour stocks of the day, and the well-publicized yearly suc-
cess of a few SBIC investments which led a portion of the in-
vestment public to believe that SBIC investments were a short-
term road to substantial profits. Despite criticism from 
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outside sources that SBICs are not fulfilling the intentions 
of Congress in eliminating the so-called equity gap and criti-
cism from within that excessive regulation is preventing SBICs 
from profitably investing in small business, the SBIC program 
has been successful to the extent that it has attracted nearly 
$600 million in private and public funds to date, two-thirds of 
which has been invested in over 5,000 small business concerns. 
Although the investment philosophies of privately-
owned and publicly-owned SBICs are quite similar, evidence al-
ready supports the finding that SBICs with less than $1 million 
in capital cannot· effectively carry out their investment poli-
cies in actual operations either absolutely or relative to their 
larger publicly-owned brethren. The problems inherent in any 
SBIC with a limited capital base involving inadequate staffing and 
management, inadequate income and serious investment restrictions 
have been amply demonstrated. These factors, plus the illiquidity 
of an investment in a privately-owned SBIC, tend to eliminate the 
investment attractiveness of privately-owned SB!Cs. 
In their short history, publicly-owned SBICs have been 
among the more volatile of stock groups with investor thinking 
ranging from the wild enthusiasm of 1960-1961, which saw SBIC 
prices rise to four and five times net asset value to the cur-
rently prevailing pessimism that has seen the liVerage price of 
SBIC common stock decline to 60 percent of book value. The most 
significant influences on this price action are believed to be the 
new issue market, legislative changes and the results of individual 
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SBIC investments in small business concerns. These factors 
will undoubtedly be of major significance to the price action 
of the group in the future. 
Despite the initial investor response to SBIC com-
mon stocks, which contributed to the subsequent sharp deflation 
in prices, venture capital investing is essentially a long-term 
proposition. Spectacular results in the early years cannot be 
expected. This is necessarily so, as it takes time for an SBIC 
to put its funds to work, and additional time for its portfolio 
small business concerns which are in an early stage of develop-
ment to reach a point where their future can be reasonably 
determined. 
American Research and Development Corporation has 
demonstrated that over a longer~term period, venture capital in-
vesting can prove to be a satisfactory investment vehicle. Oper-
ating in a quite similar fashion, despite Government restric-
tions, there is no reason to believe that over the longer-term 
selected SBIC common stocks cannot match or even exceed the 
record compiled by the nation's leading venture capital organiza-
tion. Therefore, selected SBICs at present prices can be expected 
to be satisfactory longer-term investment vehicles for investors, 
particularly those in high income tax brackets in a position to 
benefit from the industry's tax advantages, willing to assume the 
instabilit,r and risks inherent in venture capital investments. 
SBIC common stock prices to date have moved together 
quite closely. This is due to the newness of the industry and 
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the tendency of investors to think of the industry as a whole 
rather than individual components, and the lack of established 
record upon which to evaluate differing investment philosophies, 
management and the investment portfolio. Selection of an indi-
vidual SBIC for investment is presently extremely difficult:; but 
is essential as the divergence in results which will become more 
evident with the passage of time, undoubtedly, will be reflected 
in price action. The writer suggests that at the present time 
that commitments be limited to those SBICs with assets of $5 
million or more, which are nearly fully invested and which are 
selling at substantial discounts from realistic book values. 
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